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I. THE ACT
The boy asked his mother if he could ride his bike to a
friend's house. It was about 6:30 in the evening, Saturday, May
20, 1989. As the boy rode past a small woods in his South
Tacoma neighborhood, a man, also riding a bicycle, asked the
boy if he could ride with him on the trails through the woods.
At dusk, about 9:00 p.m., the Mansfield family, father and
mother, daughter, and three nieces, entered the wooded area
to bury their family cat. As they made their way along a path
they saw the boy, in the distance, standing silently, naked, cov-
ered with mud and dried blood. Dick Mansfield swept the boy
into his arms and carried him to their home and then to the
hospital. At the emergency room, doctors found that the boy
had been anally and orally raped, stabbed in the back, and
strangled with a cord; they also found that his penis had been
cut off.
Initially the boy was in shock, unable to speak, only mum-
bling incoherently. Later, he was able to give a description of a
man with a badly pock-marked face and a large nose who was
riding a green bicycle with front and back baskets. The
description matched that of Earl Shriner, a man well known to
the Tacoma police. Detectives went to Shriner's home, where
they seized his shoes, stained with blood and mud. The soles of
the shoes appeared to match treadmarks at the scene. They
also seized his bicycle, which was green with front and rear
baskets, and a cord from his jacket that carried blonde hairs
similar to the boy's.
On Monday, Earl Shriner was charged with attempted
murder in the first degree, rape in the first degree, and assault
in the first degree.
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The following is a narrative of my participation in the
response to this act of sexual violence. This narrative begins
with the public's reaction and then moves to the law's response
to that reaction.
II. THE PUBLIC'S RESPONSE
A. Monday, May 22, 1989
The Tacoma Morning News Tribune leads its front page
story with the headline:
Past Sex Offender Suspect In Attack-Boy Too Traumatized
to Cry by Mutilation.
The opening paragraph of the story reported:
[a] Tacoma man with a 24-year history of killing, assault and
kidnapping was arrested Sunday on suspicion of raping and
sexually mutilating a 7-year-old Tacoma boy.
The story contained the following description of Shriner's
history:
Police on Sunday said Shriner was released from prison
in 1987 after serving a 21-year sentence for killing a young
girl and has been arrested for crimes involving children
since then.
But News Tribune files show Shriner was never con-
victed of killing the 15-year-old girl whose body he led police
to in 1966. Shriner was not charged for that crime but
instead was committed to the state Department of Institu-
tions as a "defective delinquent." Psychiatrists at Eastern
State Hospital then said he was too dangerous to be at large.
In that incident, after being detained for choking a 7-
year-old East Side girl, Shriner, then 16, led authorities to
the body of a 15-year-old retarded girl who had disappeared
several months earlier. The girl, who was strangled, had
been tied to a tree in a wooded area about a half-mile away
from the scene of Saturday's assault.
Files also show a long list of Shriner's other victims.
Shriner, who has been described in court records as
mildly retarded, in 1977 pleaded guilty to assault and kidnap-
ping charges in connection with the abduction of two 16-
year-old girls in Spanaway. He was sentenced to 10 years in
prison after Eastern State Hospital officials determined he
was not suited for the hospital's sexual psychopath program.
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Shriner has twice been acquitted of charges in connec-
tion with attacks on young women.
Since his release from state prison in 1987, Shriner has
served 66 days in the Pierce County Jail for second-degree
assault. Part of that sentence was suspended. Jail and police
officials Sunday said they did not know the circumstances of
that crime or the victim's age.
Shriner was released from the county jail last December
after serving 67 days for an unlawful imprisonment convic-
tion stemming from an attack on a 10-year-old boy who
escaped after being tied to a fence post and beaten. Shriner
originally was charged with attempted statutory rape and
unlawful imprisonment in connection with that attack.
After Shriner pleaded guilty to the unlawful imprisonment
count, prosecutors recommended that 30 days of his sentence
be converted to community service.
Police on Sunday said another unlawful imprisonment
charge is pending against Shriner.
Shriner appeared before the Pierce County Superior Court
on Monday afternoon. The courtroom was jammed with spec-
tators and reporters, while pickets outside demanded high bail.
The judge set Shriner's bail at one million dollars.
B. Tuesday, May 23, 1989
Tuesday's papers carried considerably more detail about
Shriner's past and began to explore the adequacy of the state's
response to that past. Under the headline "System Just
Couldn't Keep Suspect," the Tacoma Morning News Tribune
reported that state officials had sought to have Shriner civilly
committed in 1987 when he was released from prison after
serving "the full 10 year sentence for assaulting and abducting
two 16-year-old girls." The story revealed that Washington's
Parole Board had denied all requests to release Shriner on
parole. In addition, it reported that state officials had sought
civil commitment when Shriner completed his prison term
because he "had hatched elaborate plans to maim or kill
youngsters while waiting out the final months of his prison
sentence in early 1987. . . ." The chair of the state Indetermi-
nate Sentence Review Board was quoted as saying that Shriner
"had lists of apparatus he might need in that regard. . . ." The
story reported that after being held for seventy-two hours,
Shriner was released because the judge found that he did not
fit the statutory criteria for civil commitment.
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The article revealed further details on Shriner's arrests
since his release from prison in 1987. Four months after his
release he was arrested for stabbing a sixteen-year-old boy in
the arm with a knife. After an evaluation at a state mental
hospital, Shriner was found competent to stand trial by a psy-
chologist who reported "[b]ecause he seems to possess such
tenuous behavioral controls over aggressive and sexual
impulses, we believe he is a high risk for future violent acts,
especially against children."
Initially, Shriner was charged with assault in the second
degree for the attack on the sixteen year old. After plea bar-
gaining, Shriner pled guilty to the misdemeanor of attempted
simple assault and was sentenced to the statutory maximum
sentence of ninety days in jail. The Tacoma Morning News
Tribune reported that the judge who sentenced Shriner was a
presiding criminal judge who would see up to one thousand
cases per month and did not remember Shriner. When asked
about the psychologist's report, the judge stated that "[y]ou
can't give an exceptional sentence based simply on someone's
thought that they might be dangerous in the future."
The Tacoma Morning News Tribune also reported that
Shriner was arrested again in January, 1988 in connection with
an attack on a ten-year-old boy who was tied to a fence post
and beaten. Originally charged with attempted unlawful
imprisonment, a gross misdemeanor, and attempted statutory
rape, a felony, Shriner plead guilty to attempted unlawful
imprisonment when the attempted statutory rape was dropped
as part of a plea bargain. He was sentenced to sixty-seven days
in jail and ordered to pay $78 in court costs and $70 to the
crime victim's compensation fund. He was released from jail in
December, 1988.
The Tacoma Morning News Tribune story also announced
that donations towards the mutilated boy's medical bills could
be sent to a Tacoma bank.
The story quickly spread throughout the state. Tuesday
morning's Seattle Post-Intelligencer, the newspaper with the
widest circulation in the state, carried a front page story under
the headline "Mutilation Suspect Denies All Charges-Specta-
tors Cheer As Judge Sets High Bail." The story contained
essentially all the information carried by the Tacoma Morning
News Tribune. Tuesday afternoon's The Seattle Times, carried
the story on page one under the headline "Outrage In
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Tacoma-Police Frustrated, Neighbors Angry That Suspect in
Boy's Mutilation Was Free."
C. Wednesday, May 24, 1989
Wednesday's news focused on the fact that so many offi-
cials had known of Shriner's history and had predicted he
would commit acts of violence. The Tacoma Morning News
Tribune carried two front page stories, one under the headline
"Outrage Over the Attack, Over the System," and the other
under the headline "Lack of Options, Data, Time Restrict
What Judges Can Do." It also editorialized about "[a]n offense
that calls for outrage." The Seattle Times headlined its story,
"System Couldn't Cope With Assault Suspect," and detailed
Shriner's past contacts with Washington's criminal, juvenile,
and civil commitment systems. Under the heading, "Put Muti-
lators Away," the Seattle Post-Intelligencer editorialized:
This case makes clear that a class of criminal exists that
is beyond reach of rehabilitation because of mental deficien-
cies. Such people cannot be put to death by a just society.
But justice also demands that society be protected from
such people.
The legal system needs to be changed to make it possi-
ble to remove the criminally insane from society, quickly
and permanently. In such obvious cases as this, the law
should err, if it errs at all, on the side of protecting the
innocent.
The Seattle Times editorial entitled "Tighter Controls
Needed On Repeat Sex Offenders" stated:
Whoever stabbed, raped, sexually mutilated and left for
dead the 7-year-old boy in Tacoma should never walk the
streets again.
If it was the repeat sex offender who has been accused
of the sickening attack, the laws that allow such people to
prey on victims over and over must be tightened.
The Spokane Spokesman-Review, the largest circulation
paper in Eastern Washington, headlined its Wednesday lead
editorial "Protection of Society: Justice System Fails." It
stated:
Two defendants face serious charges in the mutilation of
a 7-year-old Tacoma boy.
One defendant is Earl Kenneth Shriner. Culminating a
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long record of assaults on children, Shriner allegedly
accosted a 7-year-old boy who was out riding his bicycle on
Saturday, raped him and cut off his penis.
The other defendant is our criminal-justice and mental
health commitment system, which stands accused of a gross
failure to protect society.
In Olympia, the state capital, The Olympian reported on
the reaction of state officials under the headline "Mutilation
Sparks Outrage-Legal Limitations Frustrate Officials." A
spokesperson for Governor Booth Gardner was quoted as
saying:
The governor was just pale at the thought of this, it's
hard to fathom.... Everyone is in a state of shock and say-
ing, "We've got to do something about this."
This is another case, as unfair as it is, where something
awful has to happen to change the laws. But anger can be an
opportunity also.
The spokesperson said the Governor called for a change in
state law:
[T]o make certain these kinds of cases don't fall through the
cracks .... Gardner, the Governor, said there should be a
way to involuntarily commit people who have a profile of an
individual that is a known risk with a high degree of
probability that they would commit this type of crime. The
governor wants the debate. He has no specific legislation at
this stage. He wants to start the ball rolling ....
The Secretary of the Department of Corrections indicated
that Washington's civil commitment laws may be inadequate.
He was quoted as saying:
The measure is whether a person is imminently danger-
ous to one's self or others. , That's a very difficult standard to
meet.
There are gaps between the civil and criminal laws that
certain persons with developmental disabilities and mental
health problems fall ....
The Secretary of the Department of Social and Health
Services, the agency that sought civil commitment of Shriner
in 1987, was quoted as saying "[i]t seems like our people have
done a pretty darn good job of marking the boxes on this per-
son's future risk to society. The court just didn't buy it."
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In addition to stories about Shriner and the system's fail-
ure to protect the public from him, the boy's story was promi-
nent in the press. The Tacoma Morning News Tribune carried
a story headlined "The Little Boy Isn't Alone," which featured
a photograph of the boy, sitting up in his hospital bed, with his
mother, surrounded by stuffed animals and balloons. The arti-
cle began: "[tjhe little boy's mother wants you to know that
the healing has begun." The story continued:
The mother would like you to know that her son is sitting
up in bed now, playing "Zelda" on the hospital Nintendo.
On the video screen he's a little guy who is walking through
the woods. Monsters are constantly jumping out of the
woods to attack him. The video guy is zapping all the mon-
sters-every one of them.
The story reported that "teddy bears, toys, balloons and hun-
dreds and hundreds of cards" had been received at the hospi-
tal, all addressed the same way: "To the Little Boy."
The story quoted extensively from the boy's mother, and
concluded:
Her son's present and future pain fills the child's
mother with anger-both at his attacker, and at a system
that requires a child to suffer before such people are treated
or incarcerated.
"I want the people out there to know that they have
every right to be angry about this," she said. "They have
every right to be concerned and care and I appreciate that
part. I want them to know it's being received. It has got to
have a lot to do with how quickly things are developing back
to normal for us.
"But I don't want them to let go of that anger. That
anger is what's got to keep the public opinion of this situa-
tion alive until it's actually dealt with, until in some way, not
just this person is dealt justice, but this loophole is plugged.
If it's [sic] money to create another place, or people to do
more studies. I don't know what the answer is to the situa-
tion. Whatever it is we have to keep that anger on fire until
it's resolved," the mother said.
"People will forget if they're not reminded, and anger
reminds them deeply that they'd better do something about
it."
The same edition carried a lead editorial that stated, in part:
It's an axiom of law enforcement that sexual psycho-
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paths who shun treatment go hunting for new victims
sooner or later. Yet Shriner was still at large after multiple
convictions. There are no obvious culprits. Judges and cor-
rections officials tried hard to keep him locked up. The
police have attempted to watch him. But as Pierce County
Prosecutor John Ladenburg said, "[W]e've got to wait for the
guy to commit a major offense, when everybody knows he's
going to re-offend." Something seems to be fundamentally
wrong with the law. Common sense would dictate that sex-
ual psychopaths ought to be permanently isolated from soci-
ety once it becomes clear they'll never be rehabilitated.
By Wednesday, more than $17,000 in donations had been
received by the boy's fund. Employees at the Boeing Company
offered a trip to Disneyland. The Fern Hill Tavern in the boy's
neighborhood held a benefit, which raised thousands of dollars.
Throughout Washington, a variety of activities, from junior
high school bake sales to radio auctions, raised money to cover
medical expenses.
Concerned legislators responded to the public outrage.
The chair of the Washington State Senate Law and Justice
Committee, Kent Pullen (R-Kent) announced that his staff
was looking into the matter. Senator Phil Talmadge (D-Seat-
tle), the ranking minority member of the Committee, asked
Senator Pullen and the chair of the Senate Health Care and
Corrections Committee to schedule joint hearings in an effort
to determine why Shriner was "out walking on the street."
D. Thursday, May 25, 1989
The newspapers carried stories on the Fern Hill commu-
nity's attempt to protect itself from Shriner, who lived with his
mother next door to a route children took to and from Larch-
mont Elementary School. When notified by the police in the
fall of 1988 of Shriner's past and his residence in the area,
school officials considered sending parents a letter with
Shriner's picture, but never followed through. In a story from
The Seattle Times entitled, "When a Felon Lives Next Door,"
the principal was quoted as saying: "I wanted the picture to
show parents. They said, 'No you cannot have it.' They said,
'Legally you can't show parents or tell them....' They told me
this man had served his time and was starting a new life." An
article in the Tacoma Morning News Tribune quoted Tacoma
police as saying they were "hampered by laws that keep police
from acting unless a crime is committed" and that "we techni-
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cally couldn't put his face on a billboard to tell people he was
there."
The article also reported that school officials had identi-
fied the fifty students who walked by the Shriner house on the
way to school and had teachers count those children each
morning and before they left in the afternoon. An additional
crossing guard was hired to help watch the children, and the
principal visited the Shriner home to let the Shriners know he
was "in the area."
The Seattle Times reported that the felony charges against
Shriner in 1987 and 1988 were reduced to misdemeanors
because the "children who were the victims of his assaults
couldn't be made to testify against him in court." The Seattle
Times reported that "[o]ne victim had moved to Florida and
wouldn't return. The other was a 'street kid' who couldn't be
found by prosecutors when it came time to go to trial." The
Prosecuting Attorney was quoted as saying "[i]f we'd have
tried to go to trial, we'd have ended up with nothing, twice."
The Seattle Times also reported that the psychiatrist who
had testified at the 1987 civil commitment hearing concluded
that Shriner was "a high risk for future violent acts, especially
against children," stating:
The laws are very specific, it's very difficult to have
someone committed in this state.... There has to be a hear-
ing, you have to have someone testify they were placed in
immediate danger.
It makes you feel you're sitting here, very ineffective. I
wish there were laws so this could be acted on. Many of
these people should not be on the street.
The attorney who defended Shriner at the civil commit-
ment hearing pointed out that mental health experts disagree
as to whether pedophilia is a mental illness. The attorney was
later quoted by the May 27, 1989 Tacoma Morning News Trib-
une as saying the law requires that the state must prove
"recent and overt acts" that might put the patient or the com-
munity at danger. "You can threaten all you want," he said.
The director of the sex-offenders treatment program at
Twin Rivers Correctional Center, Dr. Barbara Schwartz, a
nationally recognized expert in the field, said "[f]rom what I've
read about Shriner, I don't think there was a state in the
nation where he could have been committed."
The Tacoma Morning News Tribune carried a column by
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an editorial writer featuring the opinions of Maureen
MacNamara, the executive director of the Sexual Assault Cri-
sis Center of Pierce County. The editorial stated that Ms.
MacNamara realized that because the issue of child sexual
assault is currently so visible, she can reach out to the commu-
nity and harness emotion, translating it into action. The col-
umn announced a "public forum on child sexual assault" for
Tuesday, May 30, which "legislators, law enforcement and
social service representatives" would attend.
E. Friday, May 26, 1989
A group of protestors gathered on the steps of the Capitol
Building in Olympia to demand that the Governor call a spe-
cial session of the legislature to enact tougher penalties for sex
offenders, including life imprisonment for repeat sex offend-
ers. The group was led by Mike Ballasiotes, brother of the late
Diane Ballasiotes, who was murdered in Seattle in September
1988.
Ms. Ballasiotes's murder had created its own storm of con-
troversy when it was learned that her murderer, Gene Kane,
was a convicted sex offender who had served thirteen years in
prison and was, at the time of the murder, a resident of a
work-release program in downtown Seattle as a "transition" to
release. Kane had not received treatment as a sexual psycho-
path because he was considered too dangerous for treatment in
the mental hospital where the treatment program was then
located.
A spokesperson for the Governor stated that the office had
received 1,000 calls and letters about the Tacoma boy by Friday
afternoon, the most correspondence the Governor had ever
received on one issue in such a short time. The Sun
(Bremerton) reported that the executive officer of the state
Sentencing Guidelines Commission stated that she had calls
"from people who indicated they had never made a phone call
on a matter of public policy in their lives."
Senators Pullen and Talmadge set a public hearing for the
next Friday. Senator Talmadge said he would ask the Gover-
nor to create a commission to develop a statewide plan for the
criminal justice system to help determine where the money
should be spent.
The Governor released a letter directing state officials to
find ways to eliminate the "gaps that exist between civil and
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criminal commitments, particularly regarding predatory
offenders." The letter stated:
I share the anger and frustration generated in everyone
who has heard of this particular case.
I believe we must turn that anger and frustration into
finding effective solutions that will keep violent and danger-
ous people off the streets. Such solutions must be able to
withstand any constitutional test so that they won't be
thrown out by the courts, sending us back to square one
again.
Sadly, we can't turn back the clock for the little boy in
Tacoma or erase his pain and suffering, but we must do
everything we can, as soon as we can, to try to prevent this
kind of thing from ever happening again.
Also on Friday, the first voices of caution were heard. The
Seattle Post-Intelligencer quoted Senator Janice Neimi (D-
Seattle), a lawyer and former Superior Court judge, as saying:
I'm really worried about this rush to justice. As long as eve-
ryone is so concerned about it, I think we should be very
thoughtful. We don't do things well when we do them in a
hurry, and I hope we can do it in a studied and reasoned
way.
The same article quoted a spokesperson for the American
Civil Liberties Union as saying:
There is no simple answer to a problem like this. I
think it's wrong to look for one and it's wrong to expect poli-
ticians to come up with one.
We have to simply accept the fact that there are going to
be tragedies that we can't protect against. We have to realize
that that's life in an urban environment.
F. The Second Week
Public concern continued to mount. On Tuesday, May 30,
over 300 people packed an auditorium in Tacoma to participate
in a public forum about child sexual assault while another 150
watched the proceedings on closed circuit television in an adja-
cent room. More than 200, including the state Attorney Gen-
eral, remained locked outside by order of the fire marshall. As
reported by The Seattle Times on May 31, 1989, Pierce County
Prosecutor John Ladenburg and Tacoma Police Chief Ray
Fjetland agreed that the legislature must adopt a law dividing
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sex offenders into the treatable and untreatable. Under such a
plan, the treatable would be supervised for life while the
untreatable would be locked up for life. Ladenburg called for
the state to create a "mental health prison" and for changes in
the state's privacy laws to allow authorities to notify the com-
munity when violent offenders are released from prison. The
meeting ended with a statement from the head of the Washing-
ton Coalition of Sexual Assault Programs, who was reported
by the Tacoma Morning News Tribune as saying that "[y]ou
must make a commitment and carry it out of this room and
make it ring so loud throughout this state that nobody can
ignore it."
On Wednesday, May 31, the boy was released from the
hospital and returned home. The Tacoma Morning News Trib-
une quoted the boy's mother as saying:
By noon he had said goodbye to his friends at the hospital,
eaten French toast and cocoa at Hondo's restaurant, changed
into jeans and a T-shirt and asked his mother to let him go
to school and play on the neighborhood Slip and Slide.
She said:
I'm totally thrilled with the recovery rate of my son and the
behavior that he's coming home with. I think my biggest
fear was that he was going to be afraid, that he was going to
be wanting to stay sheltered. He's already talking about
school. He's already at the neighbor's playing, wanting to
get away with breaking rules ....
She also announced that she was committed both to helping
her son resume a normal life and to becoming an instrument
of change. She said:
It's important for me to still convey the need to chal-
lenge our legislators to really find a solution. I've stated
before and I truly feel that the answers to the situation are
not negatives.
It's not telling us what won't work and what they can't
do. It's telling us what they do need and what will work, so
the community will be better able to mobilize. I'm out here
to try and help everyone focus the different factions and
ideas that will help the system.
I want to help other kids in this same situation or a sim-
ilar situation-the sexually abused and assaulted children.
As I have said, my son is every child. He could have been
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anyone's. And it will be someone else's again if things don't
come around for a change. Things have got to change.
G. The Third Week
Contributions to the fund for the boy continued to pour in.
By Friday, June 2, the fund had reached $250,000; a week later
it had grown to over $335,000. Public meetings continued, and
the number and variety of proposals for legislative action grew.
On June 3, The Seattle Times reported that Ida Ballasiotes, the
mother of Diane Ballasiotes, testified at a Senate hearing: "I'm
not mad as hell. I'm enraged. I don't want to hear again that
this person or that person fell through the cracks. I want the
cracks filled."
The same article reported that citizens and legislators
were calling for a special session of the legislature. The Gover-
nor stated he was not opposed to a special session, but that the
proposed legislation must be carefully crafted and not merely
an irrational reaction to public outrage. He said, "we want a
solution that would stand the test of time, not a solution that is
just window dressing." On June 2, 1989, the Tacoma Morning
News Tribune stated that Representative Marlin Appelwick
(D-Seattle), chair of the House Judiciary Committee, cautioned
that a slow deliberate approach to the problem was needed and
that distinctions must be drawn between the actual failures of
the system and failures in human judgment by those who had
discretion over Shriner in the past. Other legislators voiced
similar sentiments. Senate Majority Leader Jeannette Hayner
(R-Walla Walla) was quoted by the June 25, 1989 Tacoma
Morning News Tribune as saying that she wanted to wait until
solutions had been agreed to and drafted, stating, "[y]ou don't
rush out there and do anything without careful consideration.
We're not China." The Governor reported that many rank and
file legislators had complimented, privately, his decision to
hold off on calling a special session until concrete proposals
existed.
Public demands for action continued to mount. The
Tacoma boy's mother, Helen Harlow,1 joined Ida Ballasiotes,
and other victim advocates to found the Tennis Shoe Brigade,
an organization that soon expanded statewide. They asked citi-
1. The boy's surname is not Harlow, and his name has never been reported by the
media.
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zens to send one child's tennis shoe with a note to the Gover-
nor requesting him to "please protect us, have a special
session." The shoes were to symbolize the feet of those enti-
tled to walk without fear.
III. THE LAW'S RESPONSE
On June 15, the Governor acted. By executive order, he
created The Governor's Task Force on Community Protection
and charged it with the following responsibilities:
1. Review the current criminal justice system and the
mental health civil involuntary commitment process to mea-
sure their effectiveness in confining persons who are not
safe to be at large in the community.
2. Assess the relationship between these criminal and
mental health systems to identify the shortcomings.
3. Research the feasibility of creating a specialized, secure
facility for certain categories of people who represent the
most risk to society.
4. Consider research and approaches to enhancing our abil-
ity to accurately predict future behavior of individuals who
have committed or who have threatened to commit violent
criminal acts and establish legal criteria for confining them.2
The Executive Order established a December 1, 1989 dead-
line for the Task Force. The Governor appointed Norm
Maleng, King County Prosecuting Attorney as committee
chair.' The Task Force was composed of twenty-four mem-
bers, including professionals in the criminal justice system, leg-
islators, treatment professionals, academics, and three
representatives of victims; Helen Harlow, Ida Ballasiotes and
Trish Tobis, a victim of a violent assault and the president of
Family and Friends of Missing Persons and Violent Crime Vic-
tims. 4 I was named a member.5
While Helen Harlow and Ida Ballasiotes continued to call
2. Exec. Order No. 89-04, Wash. St. Reg. 89-13-055 (1989).
3. Maleng's appointment was widely praised by individuals on all sides of the
issue. The director of the Seattle Public Defender Association said: "Maleng is very
widely respected, a brilliant pick. You know its not going to be a white wash when you
pick your opponent, and with Maleng you also know it's not going to be a screaming
crazy guy. He is reasonable." Barry Siegel, Locking Up Sexual Predators, Los
ANGELES TIMES, May 10, 1990, at A-30.
4. Families and Friends of Missing Persons and Violent Crime Victims was
formed in the 1970's as a response to a series of missing persons who were later
determined to be the victims of serial killers. Ted Bundy confessed to a number of
these murders the day before he was executed in Florida on January 24, 1989. See
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for an immediate special session of the legislature, they agreed
to serve on the Task Force. "You've got to work on all fronts,"
said Ballasiotes.
The editorial reaction to the creation of the Task Force
was uniformly favorable. The Seattle Post-Intelligencer said:
This constitutes an orderly, thoughtful and potentially effec-
tive procedure. The problem of sexual crime is too special to
be thrust before a hastily summoned special session of an
unprepared Legislature.
The June 22 Spokane Spokesman Review editorialized that
"reforms of the criminal justice system require more than pas-
sion," and that "[if] we're going to toughen our laws-and
indeed, we should do so-we ought to take the time to do it
right."
Legislative leaders backed the Governor and agreed to
hold off on independent investigations of the Shriner case.
The Senate Majority Leader, Jeanette Haynor, said she wanted
to wait until solutions were agreed to and drafted. The June
25, 1989 Tacoma Morning News Tribune quoted her as saying
"[y]ou don't rush out there and do anything without careful
consideration," she said. The chair of the House Judiciary
Committee said:
No one knows what the hell to do. The last thing I want to
do is to go to Olympia and have everyone's blood pressure go
up with everyone anxious to do something even if it doesn't
solve the problem.... The situation is such that it would be
difficult to resist bad ideas.
We first met as a Task Force on July 6. That meeting
established a pattern that continued throughout our existence.
The meeting was public and was attended by both print and
electronic media. The chair implemented a structure for our
work with regard to meeting dates, organization into subcom-
Michael Mello, On Metaphors, Mirrors, and Murders: Theodore Bundy and the Rule of
Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 887 (1990-91).
5. Although I have been a law professor since 1981, I practiced law for the
previous 18 years, the last 16 as a prosecutor. From 1971 to 1981, 1 was Chief Criminal
Deputy of the King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, where I worked with and
later for Norm Maleng. Maleng and I are longstanding professional colleagues and
personal friends. He served as Chief Deputy of the Civil Division of the King County
Prosecuting Attorney's Office from 1971 through 1978 while I served as Chief Deputy
of the Criminal Division. I remained as Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division when
he was elected as King County Prosecuting Attorney in 1978 until I joined the
University of Puget Sound faculty in 1981.
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mittees,6 public hearings, and deadlines, but not with regard to
the substance of our discussions or the context of our
proposals.
Helen Harlow was unable to attend the first meeting, but
wrote the Task Force: "I intend to ask and expect more of you
than you've done in the past or thought you were prepared to
do. I challenge you to share the public's outcry for severe and
immediate measures." Ida Ballasiotes said "Helen Harlow and
I will be your conscience."
The following discussion is based on my recollection of
how the Task Force reached its recommendations. While my
primary focus will be on that portion of our recommendations
dealing with civil commitment for sexually violent predators, it
is important to keep in mind that the Task Force made these
recommendations as part of a comprehensive package. The
civil commitment proposal was thus developed as a part of an
integrated set of recommendations, and the comprehensive
nature of our work sheds light on the process by which we
reached our conclusions. I do not claim, however, that I am
capable of objectively describing the way the Task Force
approached its tasks and reached its conclusions, or even that I
am capable of describing why I reached the personal judg-
ments that I did. I share Studs Turkel's view: "I make no pre-
tense of 'objectivity'; there ain't no such animal, though we
play at the hunt."7 This is my hunt, in 1992, to recall and
reflect on what was done in 1989.
I had been a part of many law reform efforts in the past.'
In its formal aspects, this experience was similar to those other
6. I was appointed chair of the subcommittee charged with developing proposals
for changes in the law.
7. STUDS TURKEL, THE GREAT DIVIDE: SECOND THOUGHTS ON THE AMERICAN
DREAM 4 (1988).
8. As an Assistant Attorney General, I served as the staff director of Washington's
first criminal justice planning agency, initially funded by the Office of Law
Enforcement Assistance and later by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.
From 1969 to 1970, I was involved in drafting legislation to reform Washington's
gambling laws. I served as a member of the group responsible for drafting
Washington's Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted in 1973, and of another group that
revised the penal code in 1976. I also assisted in drafting Washington's Sentencing
Reform Act of 1981, and I have worked with the Sentencing Guidelines Commission
on its implementation since becoming an academic in 1981. See STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF STREET CRIME (1991). I am the character referred to in
that book as "Billy Dorffler." Over the years, I have been appointed to a number of
governmental bodies charged with studying perceived problems and recommending
solutions. I was one of the "usual suspects" typically appointed to such bodies as the
Task Force on Community Protection. See Memorandum from Patricia Shelledy, Staff
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efforts. We began with the general perception that a problem
existed that was capable of reform, went through a scoping
process to define the parameters of the problem and of poten-
tial solutions, and worked toward agreement via the drafting
process.
In its substantive aspects, however, this experience was
different. The core of this problem was not the exercise of gov-
ernmental power but the absence of that power. The boy's
story was different not only because of the horrific violence
that was inflicted, but also because so many government offi-
cials knew so much about Earl Shriner, had predicted that he
would do what he did, had sought to use the legal system to
prevent him from doing what he did, and had failed. Appar-
ently, the law was powerless to protect.
As we came to understand it, the failure was not caused by
a mistake on the part of some official. While in some situa-
tions one might question the wisdom of the discretionary deci-
sions made by judges and prosecutors, at its core this case
could not be explained as involving a systemic mistake. The
legal system seemed to work as it was designed. This conclu-
sion, however, was unacceptable to the public and to us. I
begin my analysis of the Task Force recommendations by
reflecting9 on that conclusion with an assessment of the law's
response to Earl Shriner in the past; I then identify the alter-
Attorney, House Judiciary Committee to House of Representatives Members (August
1, 1989) (on file with author).
Lest my history leave any question, my use of the narrative form is not because I
see myself as an "outsider," see Symposium Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073
(1989), but because the form seems best suited to the task at hand. I had no intention
of using this form when I participated in the Task Force in 1989. Then I wrote in the
language of an insider, that is, in language that authorizes the "organized social
practice of violence." Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601,
1602 n.2 (1986). This is a story of how and why I participated in such an act. It serves,
for me, as a way to confront the moral qualities of my actions. It is a "tale ... about
how an implicit canonical script has been breached, violated, or deviated from .... "
Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 11
(1991). I also recognize that it serves as an example of "the privilege of recounting the
past" from the perspective of the "victor." David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The
Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152, 2152 (1989).
9. The need to communicate requires that I impose a structure on this recounting
of our discussions and conclusions, but they actually took place in pieces, over time, in
different settings and among groups of differing membership. As subcommittee chair,
I conducted the meetings with a loose hand. I sought to encourage participation and to
achieve consensus. We talked more than we argued, and explained why we believed in
what we did more often than we challenged why others believed as they did. We
never voted, and our final product was unanimous. What follows is my organization of
how the issues were presented and resolved.
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natives proposed as a response to the law's failure to protect
the community against Earl Shriner. Finally, I describe the
considerations that led me, and later the Task Force, to reach
our conclusions.
A. The Law's Response To Earl Shriner
Shriner was released from prison in 1987 because his ten
year maximum sentence had expired.'0 He had not been
released on parole because the parole board had applied its
statutory mandate not to release Earl Shriner unless "in its
opinion his rehabilitation had been complete and he is a fit
subject for release."" Corrections officials, knowing that the
statutory maximum term was about to expire, took Earl
Shriner's case to the civil commitment system. Civil commit-
ment proceedings were instituted, all the relevant evidence
was apparently presented, and the judge ruled that Earl
Shriner could not be civilly committed.
Although the confidentiality surrounding individual civil
commitment cases prevented us from gaining a precise under-
standing of the basis for the judge's dismissal of the civil com-
mitment proceeding against Earl Shriner, 2 we concluded that
the civil commitment system was not designed for cases such
10. In 1977, Shriner was convicted of one count of assault in the second degree and
of one count of kidnapping in the second degree. Both are class B felonies punishable
"by imprisonment in a state correction institution for a maximum term of
imprisonment of 10 years." WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.020(b) (1989). The Sentencing
Reform Act of 1981, which imposed a presumptive and determinative sentencing
system, applied only to crimes committed on or after July 1, 1984. Id. § 9.94A.905.
On December 15, 1977, Shriner was sentenced to 10 years on each count, with no
indication as to whether the sentences were to run consecutively or concurrently. The
sentence was suspended "to determine if . . . [Shriner] would benefit from
psychological therapy." State v. Shriner, 95 Wash. 2d 541, 542, 627 P.2d 99 (1981). The
suspended sentence was revoked on January 11, 1978 because Shriner "was found not
to be amenable to treatment." Id. On March 8, 1978, the Prosecuting Attorney
submitted a report to the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles that recommended that
the sentences be served consecutively. The sentencing judge wrote "I concur" on the
report. Id. Shriner challenged the Board's determination that the sentences were to
run consecutively, and the Washington Supreme Court unanimously held that the
sentences were to run concurrently. The court stated that "pursuant to RCW
9.92.080(2), the sentencing court is authorized to fix consecutive sentences through an
express order when pronouncing sentence. The sentencing court in this instance did
not take the action. Therefore, the sentences imposed are to run concurrently." Id. at
544.
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.100 (1989).
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.390 (Supp. 1990-91); Super. Ct. Mental Proc. R. 1.3
(1991).
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as Earl Shriner's and that the dismissal was an accurate appli-
cation of the intent of the legislature.
Our conclusion was based on the history of the civil
commitment laws. In 1973, Washington reformed its civil com-
mitment system so that the system was primarily oriented
toward the short-term treatment of acute mental illness.1 3 The
reforms involved a series of procedural requirements designed
to prevent, or at least to discourage, long-term
institutionalization.
The reforms had grown out of Washington's experience
with mental healthcare. Like the mental health systems in
many states, Washington's mental health system had tradition-
ally relied heavily on confinement when the medical commu-
nity recommended it.' 4 Standards for commitment were very
general, and few procedural protections governed the initial
decision to commit or the later decision to release. By the
early 1970's, many came to believe that this "medical" model
resulted in the excessive use of long-term confinement to treat
those suffering mental disorders. The legislature's intent in
1973 was clear. The reform's purpose was "to end inappropri-
ate, indefinite commitment of mentally disordered persons,"
"to provide . . .short term treatment of persons with serious
mental disorders," and "to encourage, whenever appropriate,
that services be provided within the community."'"
While the statutory standard for civil commitment argua-
bly was broad enough to include many whose mental disorders
were manifested through acts of sexual violence,1" in practice
the term was more narrowly defined.' In addition, the statute
13. 1973 Wash. Laws ch. 142; WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.05 (1989). See Mary L.
Durham & John Q. La Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of
Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitmen 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 395,
396-400 (1985); Ross E. Campbell, Comment, Progress In Involuntary Commitment, 49
WASH. L. REV. 617 (1974).
14. Francis Farmer, whose life is chronicled in WILLIAM ARNOLD, SHADOWLAND
(1978), illustrates the effect of such confinement. She was civilly committed to
Western State Hospital, located in Pierce County, Washington (and the location of
Earl Shriner's civil commitment hearing), from 1944 to 1950.
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.010 (1989).
16. "'Mental disorder' means any organic, mental, or emotional impairment which
has substantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or volitional functions."
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(2) (1989).
17. The statute required evaluation and testimony by a "mental health
professional," defined as a "psychiatrist, psychologist, psychiatric nurse, or social
worker, and such other mental health professionals as may be defined by rules and
regulations adopted by the secretary." Id. § 71.05.020(12). These professionals typically
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required multiple procedural reviews to take place within rela-
tively short periods of time and also emphasized that the mani-
festations of the threat of serious harm to others be recent in
time.i8  These requirements indicate that Washington's civil
commitment system was not designed for the long-term con-
finement and treatment of individuals with mental disorders
or abnormalities that manifest themselves by episodic acts of
sexual violence. We concluded that the judge's decision to dis-
miss the civil commitment petition against Earl Shriner was
not a mistake, but a decision that properly carried out the pur-
pose of the civil commitment law.
We next analyzed the criminal prosecutions of Shriner in
1987 and 1988. Both prosecutions were initially, and appar-
ently properly, charged as felonies. If Shriner had been con-
victed in 1987 of assault in the second degree, as originally
charged, his presumptive sentence range would have been
twenty-four to twenty-six months.'9 An exceptional sentence,
employed standards of mental illness as the medical community defined the term,
rather than applying the far broader "mental disorder" as defined in id. § 71.05.020(2).
18. An initial determination by a "mental health professional" permits detention
for "not more than a seventy-two hour evaluation and treatment period." Id.
§ 71.05.150(1)(b). Detention for an additional 14 days is authorized upon a judicial
determination "by a preponderance of the evidence that such person, as a result of
mental disorder, presents a likelihood of serious harm to others . . . and, after
considering less restrictive alternatives to involuntary detention and treatment, finds
that no such alternatives are in the best interests of such person or others." Id.
§ 71.05.240. Detention for an additional 90 days is authorized upon a judicial
determination that the person either "during the current period of court ordered
treatment: (i) has threatened, attempted, or inflicted physical harm upon the person
of another . . . and (ii) as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability
presents a likelihood of serious harm to others..." Id. § 71.05.320(2)(a), or "was taken
into custody as a result of conduct in which he attempted or inflicted serious physical
harm upon the person of another, and continues to present, as a result of mental
disability or developmental disability a likelihood of serious harm to others .... Id.
§ 71.05.320(2)(b). Successive 180 day periods of detention require the same findings.
Id. § 71.05.320(2). "Likelihood of serious harm" is defined as "a substantial risk that
physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon another, as evidenced by
behavior which has caused such harm or which places another person or persons in
reasonable fear of sustaining such harm." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(3)(b) (Supp.
1990-91).
19. Under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act, as it existed in 1987, assault in
the second degree was classified as a seriousness level IV crime. Shriner's prior assault
in the second degree was classified as a "violent" offense and thus would have had a
criminal history score of 2. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.360 (Supp. 1990-91). His
juvenile activities had not resulted in an adjudication of delinquency or conviction of a
crime and thus did not constitute criminal history. See id. § 9.94A.030(12)(b)
(definition of criminal history). This combination of offense seriousness and criminal
history would have produced a presumptive sentence range of 12-14 months. The
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based on his future dangerousness, could have been justified.2 °
Thus, if Shriner had received the maximum standard sentence
or a longer exceptional sentence on November 5, 1987, the day
he was sentenced, he would have been in custody on May 20,
1989, the day he attacked the little boy. The Pierce County
Prosecutor explained that the charge was reduced to the mis-
demeanor of attempted simple assault because the victim could
not be located for trial.'
In 1988, Shriner was charged with attempted statutory
rape in the first degree 22 and unlawful imprisonment of a ten-
year-old boy.23 The presumptive sentence range, assuming he
had been convicted as charged, would have been thirty-four
and one-half to forty-five and three-quarters months.24  The
charge was reduced to attempted unlawful imprisonment, a
gross misdemeanor, when the victim moved to Florida and
could not be induced to return to testify at trial.25
Although we had no way to independently verify this
explanation, the Task Force did not doubt the prosecutor's
statement that "if we'd have tried to go to trial, we'd have
ended up with nothing, twice."26 This set of circumstances
however, did raise issues of prosecutorial discretion and plea
bargaining. We discussed these issues from two perspectives.
First, assuming there was a lack of optimal prosecutorial
effort, what remedy might be proposed? My own experience
as a prosecutor taught me that while a prosecutor can do much
to structure and confine the discretion of subordinates and to
presence of the knife would have added 12 months to that range, thus producing a
presumptive sentence range of 24-26 months. See id. § 9.4A.310.
20. See, e.g., State v. Woody, 48 Wash. App. 772, 742 P.2d 133 (1987); State v. Olive,
47 Wash. App. 147, 734 P.2d 36 (1987).
21. Peyton Whitely, Lack of Witness Tied Prosecutor's Hands, THE SEATTLE
TIMES, May 25, 1989, at A-8. The Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney, John
Ladenburg, was a member of the Governor's Task Force on Community Protection.
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.040 (1989).
23. See id. § 9A.40.040.
24. Statutory rape in the first degree was classified as a Level IX offense. WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.94A.320 (1989). His prior assault in the second degree conviction would
have had a criminal history score of 2, id. § 9.94A.360 and the unlawful imprisonment
charge would have been considered a "current offense," id. § 9.94A.400(1)(a) with a
criminal history score of 1, thus giving Shriner a total criminal history score of 3. This
combination of offense seriousness and criminal history would have produced a
presumption sentence range of 46 to 61 months. Because the conviction would have
been of attempted rape, the applicable presumptive sentence range would have been
75% of that for the completed offense, or 34.5 to 45.75 months. Id. § 9.94A.310(2).
25. Whitely, supra note 21.
26. Id.
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motivate them, external efforts to curb the discretionary
actions of prosecutors will be ineffectual.27 We sought reforms
that had some potential for effectiveness; it was my judgment,
shared by many, that this was an avenue of little potential.
Moreover, focusing on the way prosecutors handled these
two cases would have begged the fundamental question. We
could not escape the fact that knowing what was known about
Earl Shriner in 1987, the state had been unable to prevent him
from committing any act of violence, not just the attack on the
boy. It was the apparent powerlessness of the state to act
under such compelling circumstances that presented the core
issue.
Our initial conclusion was that at each stage the legal sys-
tem worked essentially as intended. Each official acted appro-
priately, and the law was applied as intended. In the language
of the public debate, there was indeed a "gap" into which Earl
Shriner had fallen, but the "gap" was a longstanding, if unin-
tentional, part of our legal system. This conclusion was at the
core of both the public and the official response. The fact that
our society was defenseless against such a manifest danger was
simply unacceptable. How could a society, knowing what it
knew of Earl Shriner in 1987, lack the authority to act?
One response to this question is that such gaps are the
price of freedom. Proponents of this argument assert that to
empower the government with authority to act in such situa-
tions is inconsistent with the free society we have constructed.
These voices do not deny the tragedy that horrific violence pro-
duces; rather, they see the tragedy as a random act of nature
which is to be endured because the cost of protecting against it,
in terms of infringements on individual liberty, is too high. In
the abstract, this point of view, based as it is in the conception
of individual autonomy, is very powerful. It had influenced me
throughout my professional life to support temporal limits on
the power of the state.28 I recognized the importance of this
27. The Sentencing Reform Act sought to use judicial review to enforce a set of
legislatively mandated guidelines for prosecutorial charging and bargaining decisions.
WASH. REV. CODE 9.94A.430-60 (1989). These guidelines have had, in my judgment, no
significant effect on prosecutorial behavior.
28. Temporal limits on the power of the criminal law are not new. Even under
the former indeterminate sentencing laws, only Class A felonies could result in life
sentences. Sentences for all other crimes were limited to a statutorily established
maximum term. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.020(1)(b) (1989) (Class B felony sentences
limited to no more than 10 years); id. § 9A.20.020(1)(c) (Class C felonies limited to no
more than 5 years); id. § 9A.20.020(2) (Gross Misdeameanors limited to no more than
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issue. How much risk a community must bear because the
means to alleviate or reduce the risk threatens other more
important values is a question that, in major part, defines the
nature of a society.
At its core, the public's reaction to Earl Shriner's attack on
the boy was addressed to this defining issue. The public was
saying that the existing law had the balance wrong, at least as
applied to Earl Shriner's case. The costs, in terms of loss of
individual freedom that had been sufficient to outweigh for me
the abstract dangers that I knew the temporal limits on the
state's power permitted, were no longer sufficient when I faced
the case of Earl Shriner, knowing what was known of him in
1987. For me, the reason for the shift in the balance was that
the threat Earl Shriner presented in 1987 had been so palpable,
so apparent, that I could not conclude the community should
bear the risk of that threat.' The resolution of this issue,
which was also reached by all members of the Task Force, set
us on the road to law reform.
B. Proposals for Reform
Once we reached this conclusion, our discussion moved to
the ways in which the law might be changed to fill the "gap."
Proposals were abundant. They ranged from a return to inde-
terminate sentencing to fundamental revisions in the general
civil commitment laws. All had the potential to remedy the
apparent powerlessness which was at the center of the "gap"
we sought to fill.
Our examination of the sentencing laws brought us to
reconsider Washington's rejection of indeterminate sentencing.
Under indeterminate sentencing, which existed in Washington
until it was replaced with presumptive determinate sentencing
in 1984,30 all prison sentences were for the statutory maximum:
either twenty years to life, ten years or five years, depending
upon the classification of the felony. The decision as to when,
one year); id. § 9A.20.020(3) (Misdeameanors limited to no more than ninety days).
The Sentencing Reform Act retained these maximum terms, id. § 9A.20.021, and made
even sentences for Class A felonies determinate and thus limited in time. See id.
29. 1 recognized the danger that responding to "horror stories" may lead to
"destructive laws" and that "selective empathy or unreflective empathy can mask
moral choice." Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1651,
1652 (1987). This narrative is a way of confronting the moral choices I made.
30. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 was adopted in 1981 and became effective
as to all crimes committed on or after July 1, 1984. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.905
(1989).
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if ever, the prisoner was released was made by the Board of
Prison Terms and Paroles,31 which was directed not to "release
a prisoner, unless in its opinion his rehabilitation has been
complete and he is a fit subject for release. '32 This system
gave the state legal power for an unlimited time over persons
convicted of crimes classified as Class A felonies, which carried
a maximum term of life imprisonment. While assault in the
second degree and kidnapping in the second degree, the crimes
Shriner was convicted of in 1977, were Class B felonies punish-
able by a maximum of ten years, such serious sex crimes could
be reclassified as Class A felonies. This would provide legal
authority to confine those persons for the rest of their lives,
thus solving the problem of the state's powerlessness to act.
In fact, the Executive Committee on Violent Sex Offend-
ers, established by Washington's Attorney General, recom-
mended essentially this reform.33 It proposed the creation of a
"sexually dangerous offender sentencing alternative" that
would replace the Sentencing Reform Act's presumptive deter-
minate sentence for sex offenders. Under the proposed plan,
all sentences would be for the statutory maximum, with the
sentencing judge to set a minimum term based on the applica-
ble Sentencing Reform Act range. Release at the end of the
minimum term would be subject to the discretion of a "sexu-
ally dangerous offenders sentence review board" when, in its
opinion, "the offender's rehabilitation is complete, the offender
is an acceptable risk to be monitored in the community, and he
or she is a fit subject for release."'
My experience with Washington's former indeterminate
sentencing system led me to oppose this proposal. I had come
to believe that the central premise of indeterminate sentenc-
ing, that the nature and quantity of punishment should be
based on what was necessary to achieve some utilitarian goal,
such as rehabilitation or deterrence, was frequently in conflict
with the principle of desert. My commitment to the principle
of desert-that punishment was justified only to the extent
31. The Board continued in operation after 1984 to exercise its jurisdiction over
those convicted of crimes committed before July 1, 1984. It was renamed the
Indeterminate Sentence Review Board in 1986. 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 224.
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.100 (1989).
33. See generally ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON
VIOLENT SEX OFFENDERS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (September 1989)
[hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL FINDINGS].
34. ATTORNEY GENERAL FINDINGS, supra note 33, app. A.
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that it was deserved for what the individual had done-led me
to reject the premises of indeterminate sentencing and to work
for reform of Washington's sentencing laws in the 1970's and
1980's." The passage of years had not changed my position,
but not all members of the Task Force shared my view.
We also explored possible changes to Washington's current
determinate sentencing system. The structure of the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act makes explicit the components of present
crime and criminal history which result in the presumptive
sentence range. This permits far more precise changes than
would have been possible under Washington's former sentenc-
ing system, which relegated most sentencing authority to each
sentencing judge's individual discretion. 6 This avenue, how-
ever, would also have brought us quickly into conflict with the
principle of desert. While all agreed that those who commit
the most serious sex offenses deserved very long sentences, not
all sex offenders deserved such sentences. In addition, the sub-
stantial differences in both culpability and harm between the
statutory categories argued strongly, at least to me, against the
same very long sentences for all. 7
Although we did pursue this avenue,38 it and the proposed
return to indeterminacy presented a problem we could not
overcome: these alternatives could be applied only to crimes
committed after the effective date of the reform because of the
35. I describe the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 and its origins in
DAVID BOERNER, SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON § 2 (1985).
36. Washington's judges depart from the presumptive sentence ranges in
relatively few cases. The overall rate of exceptional sentences has ranged from 3.7% in
1987 to 4.2% in 1988. WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, SENTENCING PRACTICES
UNDER THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT, FISCAL YEAR 1987, at 15 (1988). For sex
offenses, the exceptional sentence rate was 5% in 1987 and 7.7% in 1988. Telephone
interview with David Fallen, Director, Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission
(May 14, 1992). Assuming that this pattern held, and there appeared to be no reason it
would not, legislative changes in the presumptive sentence ranges could be expected to
directly translate into changes in the actual sentence imposed.
37. Such changes would also have imposed substantial fiscal costs. Approximately
1,000 persons were convicted of felony sex offenses in fiscal year 1989. Of these, 400
are convicted of crimes classified as "violent" under the Sentencing Reform Act.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(32) (1989) (Sentencing Reform Act definition of "violent
offense"). The cost of new prison construction in the 1989-91 biennium was projected
at $115,000 per cell, and operating costs, exclusive of debt service, were estimated at
$22,000 per inmate per year.
The argument that "we can't afford it" was not persuasive to the citizen members
of the Task Force. I recall Ida Ballasiotes responding to this argument by noting that
"if that's what it will cost to protect the community, then let's go to the community
and ask them if they will pay the bill. I think they will." I believed she was right.
38. See infra note 149.
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constitutional prohibition against retroactive increases in crim-
inal punishment.3 9 I had no doubt that if the legislature was to
extend the length of sentences previously imposed, the courts
would find the legislation unconstitutional.4" While the mem-
bers of the Task Force could accept that legal judgment, they
could not accept the result.
From the beginning, we knew that any reform proposals
would be tested against one fundamental question. If the
reform had been in effect in 1987, would it have given the state
the power to act to prevent Earl Shriner from committing
future violent acts? Sentencing reforms could not answer this
question affirmatively.
Our search turned to the exercise of the state's power to
protect its citizens through involuntary civil commitment. Our
discussions of broadening the existing involuntary civil com-
mitment system presented two problems. First, changing that
system so that individuals such as Earl Shriner could be com-
mitted would fundamentally alter that system in ways incon-
sistent with its basic purpose. We believed that system was
working relatively well in accomplishing its purpose and did
not want to compromise it by giving it tasks that it was not
suited for. That reason alone, in my judgment, would not have
been sufficient to prevent recommendations for reforms in the
civil commitment system if they had been the only avenue to
an affirmative answer to the central question. But we had not
reached that point. Another avenue of potential use remained.
Washington, like many states, had experience with civil
commitment of sexual psychopaths. 4' It had authorized the
39. The United States Constitution provides that "... .[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex
post facto law shall be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. It also provides that "[n]o
State shall pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10,
cl. 1.
40. In Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987), Justice O'Connor stated, speaking for
a unanimous court, "to fall within the ex post facto prohibition, two critical elements
must be present: first, the law must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events
occurring before its enactment; and second, it must disadvantage the offender affected
by it." Id at 430 (quotations omitted). To attempt to increase either the maximum
term of an indeterminate sentence or the length of a determinate sentence after the
crime had been committed would have clearly met both elements. In my judgment, no
nonfrivolous argument for the constitutionality of either proposal could be made.
41. See generally WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.06 (1989), repealed prospectively by 1984
Wash. Laws ch. 209 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.005 (1989)). In 1984 as part of
the implementation of the Sentencing Reform Act, the legislature limited the statute
to "crimes or offenses committed before July 1, 1984," but did not repeal it. Id.
§ 71.06.005. See BOERNER, supra note 35, §§ 8-1 to 8-3.
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indefinite civil commitment of sexual psychopaths42 and psy-
chopathic delinquents43 who had been charged with a sex
offense." The breadth of the statute is illustrated by a 1963
description of those committed under it as those "who have
committed almost all common sexual offenses from rape to
incest, from indecent exposure to obscene telephoning, from
homosexual behavior to indecent liberties with children, from
transvestism to voyeurism."45 During the 1980's the sexual
psychopathy program had been the subject of substantial con-
troversy. Commitment occurred in either Western or Eastern
State Hospitals, where a lack of security led to a series of well-
42. " 'Sexual psychopath' means any person who is affected in a form of
psychoneurosis or in a form of psychopathic personality, which form predisposes such
person to the commission of sexual offenses in a degree constituting him a menace to
the health or safety of others." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.010 (1989). "'Psychopathic
personality' means the existence in any person of such hereditary, congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional rather than the intellectual
field and manifested by anomalies of such character as to render satisfactory social
adjustment of such person difficult or impossible." Id. § 71.06.010.
43. An earlier version of the statute defined "psychopathic delinquent" as follows:
"'Psychopathic delinquent" means any minor who is psychopathic, and who is
a habitual delinquent, if his delinquency is such as to constitute him a menace
to the health, person, or property of himself or others, and the minor is not a
proper subject for commitment to a state correctional school, a penal
institution, to a state school for the developmentally disabled, or to a state
hospital as a mentally ill person.
1977 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 80, § 42, repealed by 1985 Wash. Laws, Ch. 354, § 32.
This portion of the statute was repealed in 1985 when the legislature enacted chapter
71.34 which dealt with mental health services for minors.
44. The statute defines a "sex offense" as one or more of the following:
Abduction, incest, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, indecent assault,
contributing to the delinquency of a minor involving sexual misconduct,
sodomy, indecent exposure, indecent liberties with children, carnal knowledge
of children, soliciting or enticing or otherwise communicating with a child for
immoral purposes, vagrancy involving immoral or sexual misconduct, or an
attempt to commit any of the said offenses.
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.010 (1989). A proceeding under the Act could be commenced
"[w]here any person is charged.., with a sex offense." Id. § 71.06.020. The sexual psy-
chopathy proceeding began after the defendant's guilt or innocence was determined. If
the defendant was convicted "judgment shall be pronounced, but the execution of the
sentence may be deferred or suspended" and the sexual psychopathy proceedings sub-
stituted. Id. § 71.06.030. The statute also provides that "acquittal on the criminal
charge shall not operate to suspend the hearing on the allegation of sexual psychopa-
thy." Id.
45. Giulio Di Furia & Hayden L. Mees, Dangerous To Be At Large-A
Constructive Critique of Washington's Sexual Psychopath Law, 38 WASH. L. REV. 531,
532-33 (1963). Interestingly, this article, by the superintendent and a clinical research
psychologist at Western State Hospital, proposed replacing the definition of "sexual
psychopath" with "habitual sexual offender" defined as "a person who has a history of
involvement in sexual offenses." Id. at 533.
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publicized escapes.46 Studies by the Legislature raised substan-
tial question as to the effectiveness of the programs. In 1984,
at the recommendation of the Sentencing Guidelines Commis-
sion, the legislature replaced, prospectively, the sexual psycho-
path program with sentencing provisions authorizing
treatment in the community and in prison."
Resurrecting civil commitment of sexual psychopaths as a
means to empower the state to act in cases such as Shriner's
would, of course, raise all the issues that had previously
plagued its use.48 Yet this alternative did appear to represent a
viable approach, one that would provide authority over individ-
uals that was unlimited in time.49
C. The Path to Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators
My years in the criminal justice system had given me a
fair working understanding of both desert as the basis for pun-
ishment and of the constitutional limits, both substantive and
procedural, on the use of the criminal law. I had not had the
same opportunity to work in the civil commitment system,
except for those border areas of insanity and competency to
stand trial, and thus had no real sense of what constitutional
limits existed.
I knew that I would be asked, by both Task Force mem-
bers and legislators, with regard to whatever recommendation
we made, "is it constitutional?" I also knew that a negative
answer, even one privately given, would doom the recommen-
dation. The Governor created the Task Force, and the legisla-
tors deferred to the Task Force because it provided a
windbreak to protect them from the raw force of public pas-
46. In December 1988, Gary Minnix, who had been committed to Western State
Hospital as incompetent to stand trial on four rape charges, committed a rape at knife
point while committed. The fact that he had been permitted to leave the hospital on
"furlough" did not reassure the community. State v. Minnix, No. 88-1-03830-1 (Pierce
Cty. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 30, 1988).
47. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.120(8) (1989 & Supp. 1990-91). See also
BOERNER, supra note 35, at ch. 8.
48. See, e.g., Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 CRIME
& JUST. 1, 8 (1985) ("They disgraced our jurisprudence, grossly misapplying what little
knowledge we have about the sexual offender, achieving injustice without social
protection.").
49. The sexual psychopath law authorized commitment until such time as the
person "has improved to an extent that he is no longer a menace to the health, lives or
property of himself or others." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.240 (1985).
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sion. Had the Governor and legislature wanted to lead by run-
ning in front of the political wind, the Task Force would not
have been created. Our role was to modulate the public pas-
sion into responsible reform; a requirement that included the
judgment that the reform be constitutional. It was at this
point that I explored the constitutional limits of the state's
power to use involuntary civil commitment to protect its mem-
bers from danger.
My answer to this question would, of necessity, involve a
prediction, because I knew that what that future questioner
would really be asking was whether the courts would find our
recommendation constitutional. To the practical mind, a law's
constitutionality is not an abstract normative issue. It is a pre-
diction, as Holmes put it, of what "the courts are likely to do in
fact."5 ° Such an inquiry would not end the matter, for Holmes
was referring to an effort by a "badman" who sought to "know
the law and nothing else."'" I also sought to approach my
responsibilities as a "good" man "who finds his reasons for con-
duct... in the vaguer sanctions of conscience,"52 but the initial
boundaries of permitted action are located by the first inquiry.
Over the years I had come to approach the question of
whether to propose a particular reform with two questions.
First, "can we?" and then, "should we?" I sought not to con-
fuse the two questions, because separation promotes clarity of
thought, forcing one to confront the issues of personal respon-
sibility that are ever present when one works, as I have for so
many years, "in a field of pain and death. '5 3 Separation of
these two questions also prevents one in the privileged position
of a lawyer from wrapping judgments of personal value with
the rhetorical power of a constitutional imperative. Govern-
ment may permissibly undertake many actions, under prevail-
ing constructions of the Constitution, that would be, in my
judgment, a misuse of power. The point is not that my opinion
on the wisdom of a proposal was irrelevant; I was a member of,
not a lawyer for, the Task Force. The point is that I had differ-
ent roles and the failure to keep them separate would prevent
both me and those who listened to me from understanding
what I was saying.
50. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 561 (1897).
51. Id. at 459.
52. Id.
53. See Cover, supra note 8.
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What I found in my exploration of how the Supreme
Court viewed civil commitment was initially surprising but
upon reflection made sense. My conclusion did not resolve the
moral dilemma that I would face, but it gave me confidence in
the prediction I was eventually to make.
Civil commitment, that is the taking control of the person
of another for reasons other than punishment, was, I found, a
very old tradition.- Since the founding of our country, organ-
ized governments had exerted the power to confine persons
both for their own good and for the good of the rest of society's
members. The two purposes are based on fundamentally dif-
ferent justifications.5" The power of the state to take control of
a person for that person's own good is based on the parens
patriae power. The power of a society to protect its members
from danger is based on the police power, a power said to be
"the least limitable of the exercises of government."' While
frequently the power exercised was justified on both grounds,
the United States Supreme Court had, by my reading, never
imposed substantive limits on the power of a state acting
through the use of civil commitment to protect its members
from dangerous persons. The only case that imposed any sub-
stantive limits on the power of civil commitment stated that
the power to involuntarily commit the mentally disordered
could not be applied to those who are "dangerous to no one
and [who] can live safely in freedom.""
Even though confinement has long been utilized as a
means to protect society against those suffering from mental or
physical disorders or diseases,5 8 the issue of the constitutional-
ity of civil commitment did not reach the United States
Supreme Court until 1940.5' The Court unanimously found no
violation of due process by a statute which authorized indefi-
nite civil commitment of those with a "psychopathic personal-
54. See Alan Dershowitz, The Origins of Preventive Confinement In Anglo-
American Law: Part II, The American Experience, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 781 (1974).
55. See John Q. La Fond, The Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commmitment, 30
BUFF. L. REV. 499 (1981); Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the
Mentally il1, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974).
56. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 548 (1917).
57. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). "[A] State cannot
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible
family members or friends." Id. at 576.
58. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 55.
59. Minn. ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
[Vol. 15:525
Confronting Violence
ity." The Minnesota Supreme Court had defined psychopathic
personalities as "those persons who, by an habitual course of
misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of
power to control their sexual impulses and who, as a result, are
likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other
evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable
desire."6 ° While the Court did not expressly address substan-
tive as opposed to procedural due process, it evinced no con-
cern that this use of civil commitment was beyond the state's
power.
In subsequent decisions, the Court made a point of not
restricting a state's substantive powers to use civil commit-
ment. The Court held in Robinson v. California61 that
criminalizing narcotics addiction violated the prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Douglas concurred and
stated "[h]e may, of course, be confined for treatment or for
protection of society .. ."2 In Baxstrom v. Herold,63 a unani-
mous Court, speaking through Chief Justice Warren, held that
it was a denial of equal protection for a state to provide for
civil commitment at the termination of a prison sentence with-
out a jury trial when a jury trial was provided for all others
subject to civil commitment. The relevant constitutional prin-
ciple was procedural: that all individuals subject to civil com-
mitment be treated alike. The Court said not a word to
indicate that any substantive limits existed as to the use of civil
commitment at the conclusion of a prison sentence.
In Humphrey v. Cady,' a unanimous court, speaking
through Justice Marshall, addressed a Wisconsin statute that
authorized commitment for compulsory treatment of a person
convicted of a crime who was in need of "specialized treatment
for his mental or physical aberrations... ."' Initially, commit-
ment was limited to the length of the criminal sentence, but
the statute authorized renewal of the commitment for addi-
tional five-year terms upon a determination that discharge
would be "dangerous to the public because of the person's
mental or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality. ' 6 The
60. Id. at 273.
61. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
62. Id. at 669.
63. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
64. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
65. Id. at 510 n.6.
66. Id.
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Court characterized this confinement as being conditioned:
"not solely on the medical judgment that the defendant is
mentally ill and treatable, but also on the social and legal judg-
ment that his potential for doing harm, to himself or to others,
is great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of
liberty.
' 67
The Court then stated: "In making this determination, the
jury serves the critical function of introducing into the process
a lay judgment, reflecting values generally held in the commu-
nity, concerning the kinds of potential harm that justify the
State in confining a person for compulsory treatment."S6 The
Court went on to find that Wisconsin's denial of a jury trial to
those who had been previously convicted of a crime, while pro-
viding a jury trial to those who had not, raised significant equal
protection and procedural due process issues. Significantly,
Justice Marshall, speaking for Justices Douglas, Brennan,
Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Chief Justice Burger, did not
even hint at the question of whether commitment on such
grounds exceeded the state's power, even though the commit-
ment far exceeded the maximum sentence permitted for the
underlying crime.
The Court reached the same result in Jones v. United
States,69 upholding an indefinite commitment following an
insanity acquittal even though the commitment far exceeded
the one year maximum sentence for the underlying crime.7 °
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dissented on the
ground that the finding of not guilty by reason of insanity
could not constitutionally justify indefinite commitment.71
Justice Brennan argued that a person found not guilty by rea-
son of insanity was entitled to the same procedural protections
as required in Addington v. Texas,72 but he never suggested
that the state was without the substantive power to indefi-
nitely commit a person whose mental disorder rendered him
dangerous.
67. Id. at 509 (footnote omitted).
68. Id. (footnote omitted).
69. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
70. The underlying crime was attempted petit larceny of a jacket from a
department store. Id.
71. Id. at 371.
72. 441 U.S. 418 (1979) ("[Tlhe state ... has authority under its police power to




Most recently, in United States v. Salerno,73 the Court
addressed a substantive due process attack on preventative
confinement pending trial in criminal cases. Categorizing the
government's purpose as "regulatory" rather than "punitive, 74
a strong majority75 recognized that preventing danger to the
community was a legitimate regulatory goal.76 Rejecting the
Court of Appeals' conclusion that "the Due Process Clause
prohibits pretrial detention on the ground of danger to the
community as a regulatory measure, without regard to the
duration of the detention, ' 77 the Court said "[w]e do not think
the clause lays down any such categorical imperative. We have
repeatedly held that the Government's regulatory interest in
community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh
an individual's liberty interest." The Court found that "Con-
gress' careful delineation of the circumstances under which
detention will be permitted" was a sufficient basis for "the
individual's strong interest in liberty" to "be subordinated to
the greater needs of society. ' 78 The Court held "[w]hen the
Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an
arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an
individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with
the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from
executing that threat.
'79
Even though Salerno addressed confinement pending trial,
and Justices Marshall, ° Brennan, and Stevens8' dissented, its
message was clear. The current, and future 2 Supreme Court
would not find substantive due process limits on the power of a
state to protect its members from danger.
I recall my reaction to reading this line of cases. I had
spent the day in the law library, and as I drove home, I
73. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
74. Id. at 747.
75. The opinion was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and concurred in by
Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, O'Connor and Scalia.
76. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)).
77. Id. at 748 (quotations omitted).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 755.
81. Id. at 767.
82. By the summer of 1989, when I sought the basis for my prediction, Justice
Kennedy had replaced Justice Powell. I saw no reason to believe that he would find
greater restrictions than Justice Powell had; nor did I believe that future changes on
the Court were at all likely to result in greater limits. The replacement of Justices
Brennan and Marshall with Justices Souter and Thomas has not changed my view.
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reflected on what I had read. The great liberal judges who had
shown such sensitivity to the procedures by which the state
exercised power over individuals had shown no inclination to
impose substantive limits on that power. Developing why this
apparent dictomy exists is well beyond the purpose of this
Article, but at least part of the reason, I thought, must be the
nature of the power that the state was exercising. The police
power is "the least limitable of the exercises of government" 3
because it is a response to the collective need for self-defense.
Collective self-defense, the coming together of individuals to
create communities that will protect them from dangers, must
surely be at the very core of the rationale behind the police
power. 4 The limits on police power would come from the leg-
islation enacted through the democratic process 5 and the jury,
and in the form of procedural protections. This helped explain
why all the members of the Task Force, myself included, had
such a strong intuitive reaction against the idea that govern-
ment was constitutionally prohibited from acting to protect the
community from Earl Shriner in 1987, given what was known
of him at the time.
Based on this analysis, my constitutional prediction was
that if the state acted rationally and with due care for proce-
dural protections, the courts would find that the state had the
power under the United States Constitution to act to protect
its members.
I then turned to the Washington State Constitution and
83. See supra note 56.
84. Characteristically, Robert Cover saw this clearly. In his last published work,
he observed:
mhe violence of a posited constitutional order... is generally understood to
be implicit in the practice of law and government. Violence is so intrinsic a
characteristic of the structure of the activity that it need not be mentioned.
Read the Constitution. Nowhere does it state the obvious: that the
government thereby ordained and established has the power to practice
violence over its people. That, as a general proposition, need not be stated, for
it is understood in the very idea of government."
Robert M. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of The Word, The Deed,
and The Role, 20 GA. L. REV. 815, 819 (1986).
85. This is not to suggest that the exercise of this power is beyond judicial review.
As the first Justice Harlan said in upholding the power of a state to require
compulsory vaccination to prevent the spread of disease: "the police power... may be
exerted in such circumstances or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in
particular cases as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent wrong and
oppression." Jacobson v. Mass. 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905). A rational relationship must




reached the same conclusion. While the Washington Supreme
Court has found in some circumstances that Washington's con-
stitution provides greater protections than does the United
States Constitution, the court has not so found with regard to
the due process clause of Article I, Section 3.86 Washington's
sexual psychopath law"7 had been challenged on procedural
grounds many times and had always been upheld. Although
the Washington courts recognized that persons committed as
sexual psychopaths suffered a grievous loss of personal free-
dom," none expressed the view that indefinite civil commit-
ment under the sexual psychopath statute might be beyond the
state's power. In a decision similar to Humphrey v. Cady,"9 the
Washington Supreme Court held on equal protection grounds
that "in a sexual psychopath release proceeding, after expira-
tion of the criminal sentence, the state has the same burden of
proving dangerousness as in a civil commitment."" The court
gave no indication that the fact that the involuntary commit-
ment extended far beyond the statutory maximum for the
underlying crime limited the state's power.
Civil commitment under Revised Code of Washington
("RCW") Chapter 71.0591 had received the same treatment.
The Washington Supreme Court recognized the "massive cur-
tailment of liberty"'92 involved and held that the statute could
be applied only when the risk of danger was substantial and
the harm was serious. 3 The court did not indicate, however,
that the state did not have the substantive power to use civil
commitment as a means to protect its citizens, as long as the
predicate findings resulted from constitutionally appropriate
procedures.
I next turned to the issue of how precisely the state must
define the class of persons eligible for civil commitment. Stat-
86. The Washington State Constitution provides: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3.
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06 (1989).
88. State v. Rinaldo, 98 Wash. 2d 419, 424, 655 P.2d 1141, 1144 (1982) (quotations
omitted).
89. 405 U.S. 504 (1972). See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
90. State v. McCarter, 91 Wash. 2d 249, 257, 588 P.2d 745, 750 (1978). In Dunner v.
McLaughlin, 100 Wash. 2d 832, 676 P.2d 444 (1984), the court expressly adopted the
burden of proof required by the United States Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418 (1979) and overruled McCarter and other cases "insofar" as they "indicate
to the contrary." Dunner at 843, 676 P.2d at 451.
91. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.05 (1989).
92. In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 279, 654 P.2d 109, 111 (1982) (quotation omitted).
93. Id. at 284, 654 P.2d at 113.
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utory definitions were traditionally stated in very broad
terms94 and courts never found them unconstitutional due to
vagueness. I found it to be particularly significant that the
courts never required medically based definitions, instead
expressing concern that an exclusively medical definition
would shift the decision away from the jury toward the medi-
cal experts.
In Humphrey v. Cady,95 Justice Marshall, when finding a
jury trial to be a constitutional requirement, relied on the fact
that "the jury serves the critical function of introducing into
the process a lay judgment, reflecting values generally held in
the community, concerning the kinds of potential harm that
justify the State in confining a person for compulsory treat-
ment."'  The Washington State Supreme Court had expressed
concern that a definition that "incorporates medical terminol-
ogy" might result in a commitment decision that "may involve
more a medical decision than a legal one."97 Such a definition,
it was feared, would receive "excessive judicial deference" and
risk indefinite commitment "solely because they [the detain-
ees] are suffering from mental illness and may benefit from
treatment."98
Predicting future violence is, of course, a most difficult
94. The Minnesota statute upheld in Minn. ex rel Pearson v. Probate Court, 309
U.S. 270 (1940) defined "psychopathic personality" as:
[T]he existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or
impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment,
or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combination of any
such conditions, as to render such person irresponsible for his conduct with
respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons.
Id. at 272. The Wisconsin statute at issue in Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972)
provided for initial commitment if the judge found that the crime was "probably
directly motivated by a desire for sexual excitement" and that the person was in need
of "specialized treatment for his mental or physical aberrations." Id. at 507. Succes-
sive five-year commitments required a finding that discharge would be "dangerous to
the public because of the person's mental or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormal-
ity." Id.
Washington's sexual psychopath statutes also used very broad behaviorally focused
definitions. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.06 (1989); see supra note 42. The general civil
commitment statute employed a similar definition. RCW 71.05.020(2) provides:
"Mental disorder means any organic, mental or emotional impairment which has sub-
stantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or volitional functions." WASH.
REV. CODE § 71.05.020(2) (1989).
95. 405 U.S. 504 (1972). See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
96. Id. at 509.




task,99 but the courts have never found that its inherent inac-
curacies create a constitutional barrier to its use.100 Although
the problem of false positives 1 does not raise a constitutional
problem, it clearly presents a moral problem. That is where
my Holmesian visit to the law library left me: involuntary civil
commitment, applied via a statute drafted with a modicum of
skill and a sensitivity to the procedures used, would, in all like-
lihood, be found constitutional. My answer to the first ques-
tion "Can we?" was "Yes."10 2 Thus, the central problem was
not that the state was powerless to act in 1987, in the sense
that the constitution prohibited restraining Earl Shriner; the
problem was that the state lacked the legal authority to act.
That problem could be cured.
99. See generally Thomas R. Litwak & Louis B. Schlesinger, Assessing and
Predicting Violence, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 205 (Irving B. Weiner &
Allen K. Hess eds., 1987); PREDICTION AND CLASSIFICATION: CRIMINAL JUSTICE
DECISION MAKING (Don M. Gottfredson & Michael Tonry eds., 1987); Norval Morris &
Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 CRIME AND JUST. 1 (1985); MARK H.
MOORE, DANGEROUS OFFENDERS 64-79 (1984); JEAN FLOUD & WARREN YOUNG,
DANGEROUSNESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1981); JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981). In 1985, I characterized our predictive
abilities as "appallingly poor." BOERNER, supra note 35, at § 2.2(b)(2). More recently,
the basis for this pessimistic view has been challenged. See John Monahan, Risk
Assessment of Violence Among the Mentally Disordered." Generating Useful
Knowledge, INT'L J. OF LAW & PSYCHIATRY 249 (1988); Litwak & Schlesinger, supra.
Alexander Brooks, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709 (1992).
100. The United States Supreme Court has expressly approved basing the death
penalty, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), and indefinite civil commitment, Jones
v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), on predictions of future dangerousness. In Jones,
the court acknowledged this difficulty but concluded that "[t]he lesson we have drawn
is not that government may not act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that
courts should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments." Jones, 463
U.S. at 364 n.13. The Washington Supreme Court, while recognizing that "the
prediction of dangerousness has its attendant problems" and that the "American
Psychiatric Association has . . . confessed the profession's inability to predict
dangerousness precisely," stated that "we are not prepared to abandon the possibility
of conforming the law of involuntary civil commitment to the requirements of the
constitution." The court stated that it "can endeavor to protect against abuse by
requiring demonstration of a substantial risk of danger and by imposing procedural
safeguards and a heavy burden of proof." In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 281, 654 P.2d
109, 111 (1982).
101. False positives are those inaccurate predictions of dangerousness whose proof
of accuracy is self-fulfilling.
102. I did not conclude that no nonfrivolous argument for unconstitutionality
could be made nor was I so foolish as to offer the Task Force (or later the legislature)
a guarantee of constitutionality. What I did conclude was that it was highly likely that
the use of involuntary civil commitment for sexually dangerous persons would pass
constitutional muster. I was satisfied that if my prediction proved wrong I would be
justified in uttering the losing lawyer's retort, "That was not the law, Your Honor,
until you spoke."
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The determination that civil commitment was an available
alternative did not, of course, determine whether or how it
should be used. Some Task Force members supported broad-
ening the scope of the general civil commitment statute; addi-
tionally, the Attorney General had proposed adopting a
modified sexual psychopathy statute.1°3
My prediction of constitutionality still left me with the
much more difficult question: "Should we use civil commit-
ment as a means to protect the community?" Throughout my
years as a prosecutor, I sought to remain sensitive to the unde-
niable fact that depriving persons of their liberty involves the
intentional infliction of harm to fellow human beings-vio-
lence, as Cover correctly characterizes it-that, absent justifi-
cation, is morally wrong."° The need to justify the violence I
inflicted on a daily basis had led me to the principle of desert
as a primary justification. My answer to the question "How
can you justify the violence your decisions will do?" was
"Because it is deserved for what you have done."
While the principle of desert cannot provide a precise
answer as to what punishment is deserved in a given case, it
does provide a powerful limiting and guiding principle. The
use of desert as a limiting principle had become a central value
for me and it became a central element of Washington's Sen-
tencing Reform Act."°5 That principle, based as it is on moral
blameworthiness, does not transfer readily to the use of civil
commitment where by definition no blame exists.
103. ATrORNEY GENERAL FINDINGS, supra note 33.
104. Throughout my years of practice as a prosecutor, I kept G.K. Chesterton's
warning in mind:
[T]he horrible thing about all legal officials, even the best, about all judges,
magistrates, barristers, detectives, and policemen, is not that they are wicked
(some of them are good), not that they are stupid (some of them are quite
intelligent), it is simply that they have got used to it."
G. K. Chesterton, The Twelve Men, in TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 63, 67 (6th ed. 1920). The
characterization of what I did as "violence" was one way I sought to avoid getting
"used to it."
105. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974). Morris argues that
desert does not require punishment in every instance, it need only limit it. NORVAL
MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW, ANISONOMY OR TREATING LIKE CASES
UNALIKE 179-209 (1982). I agreed with Morris on desert as a limiting principle, but I
sided with von Hirsch, Utilitarian Sentencing Resuscitated: The American Bar
Association's Second Report on Criminal Sentencing, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 772, 783-89
(1981), who argues that desert is a requiring as well as a limiting principle, although in
my view there may be a quite large distance between what is required and what is




The law, in its formal majesty, may not consider involun-
tary civil commitment to be punishment, but the definitional
stop will not do as a response to the moral question."° The
fact that this violence was civil or regulatory in form did not in
any way lessen the need for justification. I am not a philoso-
pher, but I knew that the limiting principle, if any were avail-
able, would be found in utilitarian theory. My experience in
sentencing had taught me that the principle of maximizing
social utility, "the greatest good for the greatest number," does
not readily provide limits in individual cases. But in the aggre-
gate, and one drafting a statute is always working in the aggre-
gate, the balancing of benefit and harm could provide a moral
focus that, if it did not provide a strict limit, would at least
guide me in resolving what I saw as a dilemma.10 7 At a mini-
mum, such a balance would help me to remember that the use
of civil commitment inevitably causes harm.
I argued against the proposals for broadening the existing
civil commitment statute on the grounds that it would be over-
broad. I argued that we should focus our reforms on the cen-
tral question resulting in the creation of the Task Force. Our
remedy for the state's inability to act on its knowledge of Earl
Shriner in 1987 ought to be limited to extreme cases that were
equally compelling. Broadening the civil commitment process
by revising the definition of mental disorder or by lowering the
evidentiary requirements for continued commitment was not
sufficiently limiting. It would lead, I argued, to the extension
106. As C.S. Lewis argued so powerfully:
[D]o not let us be deceived by a name. To be taken without consent from my
home and friends; to lose my liberty; to undergo all those assaults on my
personality which modern psychotherapy knows how to deliver; to be re-made
after some pattern of "normality" hatched in a Viennese laboratory to which I
never professed allegiance; to know that this process will never end until
either my captors have succeeded or I have grown wise enough to cheat them
with apparent success-who cares whether this is called Punishment or not?
C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATA 224, 227 (1953).
As John Griffiths pointed out, "the important functional question is not what its name
is but whether it is a justifiable practice, and how its costs and benefits compare with
those of practices with different rules of implementation." John Griffiths, Review:
The Limits of Criminal Law Scholarships, 79 YALE L.J. 1406, 1411 (1970).
107. As Floud and Young put it, "What is the moral choice between the
alternative risks: the risk of harm to potential victims or the risk of unnecessarily
detaining offenders judged to be dangerous." FLOUD & YOUNG, supra note 99, at 49.
Lynne Henderson wisely counsels that "[elmpathy cannot necessarily tell us what to
do or how to accomplish something, but it does alert us to moral choice and
responsibility. It also reminds us of our common humanity and responsibility to one
another." Henderson, supra note 29, at 1653.
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of state control over many who presented little significant dan-
ger'08 and would have eroded the gains of earlier reforms of
that system. I preferred a rifle, rather than a scatter gun, as
the weapon of self-defense. Yet undeniably, expansion of the
general civil commitment statute would solve the retroactivity
problem. It would provide an affirmative answer to the central
question before us, and for most on the Task Force an affirma-
tive answer to that question was an imperative.
The Attorney General's proposed return to a modified sex-
ual psychopath statute authorizing indefinite civil commitment
for "mentally disordered sexually dangerous persons"'10 9
presented similar problems of overbreadth. Although the
Attorney General's proposal applied only to perpetrators of
certain enumerated felonies" 0° and was somewhat narrower
than Washington's former statute, over 700 persons were con-
victed of those predicate crimes in fiscal year 1989."' This pro-
posal did offer an affirmative answer to our central question,
but at the cost of excessive harm. I continued to seek a
weapon of greater precision.
I also argued against a return to indeterminacy in criminal
sentencing for similar reasons. Requiring the statutory maxi-
mum sentence for all violent sex offenders or repeat sex
offenders, as the Attorney General proposed," 2 or increasing
the maximum term for all violent sex offenses to life imprison-
ment, with release contingent on a future finding that the
offender is no longer dangerous, would result in very long
sentences and would require future predictions of
dangerousness.
My commitment to desert as a limiting principle and my
understanding of the inaccuracies inherent in predicting dan-
gerousness led me to oppose this avenue. It would have meant
that predictions of future violence would be made in circum-
stances where procedural protections were minimal."13  The
108. Under the existing civil commitment system, 9,138 petitions for commitment
were filed in 1988. See OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATION FOR THE COURTS, THE 1988
REPORT OF THE COURTS OF WASHINGTON (1989).
109. ATTORNEY GENERAL FINDINGS, supra note 33, app. B.
110. Id. at 2-3.
111. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ADULT FELONY
SENTENCING, FISCAL YEAR 1989, 8-10 (1990).
112. ATTORNEY GENERAL FINDINGS, supra note 33, app. A.
113. Predictions of dangerousness were, of course, an everyday occurrence under
Washington's former indeterminate sentencing system. Those predictions had been
held not to involve any constitutionally protected interest and thus not to require any
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undeniable difficulty in accurately predicting future danger-
ousness led me to conclude that it should be done only as a last
resort, and only in the full light of day, with generous proce-
dural protections.
As I assessed the situation, I concluded that absent a coun-
terproposal that would affirmatively answer the central ques-
tion, both retrospectively and prospectively, the Task Force
would adopt some variation of all three of the proposals I
opposed: a broadening of the eligibility criteria under the gen-
eral civil commitment statute, a return to a sexual psychopath
statute, and a return to life maximum indeterminate sentences
for all serious sex offenses." 4
As I sought counsel from those who had studied the
problems of predicting future violence, I noted that they recog-
nized that cases exist where the circumstances would be so
compelling as to make the conclusion one of common sense.
As Norval Morris said, "[t]here are exceptional, gravely
psychotic, extremely and repetitively violent persons whose
likely future criminality does not merit study since it is so
obvious.""' Morris answered the question of how to distin-
guish the "obvious" cases from those not so clear by recounting
an experience that John Monahan had related to him:
I gave my stock speech about the probability of violence
never being higher than 1-in-3 in the research. A judge
raised his hand and said that he recently had a case of a
murderer with a large number of prior violent offenses who,
when asked if he had anything to say before sentence was
imposed, stated: "if I get out, the first thing I am going to do
is murder the prosecutor, the second thing I am going to do
is murder you. Your Honor, the third thing I am going to do
is murder every witness who testified against me and the
procedural protections. Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464
(1981) (no liberty interest involved in "purely subjective evaluations" and "predictions
of future behavior"); In re Sinka, 92 Wash. 2d 555, 564, 599 P.2d 1275, 1280 (1979)
("predictive and discretionary" decisions do not "deserve minimum due process
procedural protections").
114. In New Hampshire, a brutal crime of sexual violence in 1991 resulted in the
establishment of a "Joint Ad Hoc Committee to Renew New Hampshire's Rape Laws."
It concluded: "The committee strongly recommends that the penalties for aggravated
felonious sexual assault be raised to 10 to 20 years for a first offense. For a second
offense, we propose a mandatory 20 to 40 year sentence and if a defendant has been
convicted more than two times, we recommend mandatory life imprisonment without
parole." REPORT OF THE JOINT AD Hoc COMMIrEE TO REVIEW NEW HAMPSHIRE'S
RAPE LAWS 6 (Jan. 27, 1992).
115. Morris & Miller, supra note 99, at 17.
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fourth thing I am going to do is murder each member of the
jury." The judge asked if I thought that this person's
probability of violence was no greater than 1-in-3. I called
for a coffee break.
1 16
Going for a coffee break, opting out of the struggle, was, of
course, a possibility. I could resign from the Task Force or dis-
sent from its recommendations if I found them repugnant to
my values. Taking that course would have ended any influ-
ence I would have on the Task Force's recommendations, and I
knew my opposition would have little, if any, effect on the
political process that would follow. My experience has been
not only that the perfect is the enemy of the good, but that
insistence on perfection is likely to result in the bad. I chose
the road that I hoped would lead to the good, or perhaps, the
least harm.
117
It was at that point that I picked up my pencil. Although I
shared Morris's and Monahan's judgment that there are cases
in which, to borrow Justice Stewart's phrase, "I know it when
I see it," and Earl Shriner in 1987 clearly was such a case, I
also knew that our challenge was to express that common
sense conclusion in a statutory definition. I sought to craft a
proposal that would remedy the absence of authority, not
replace existing authority with greater authority. From that
idea came the notion of limiting the new authority to only
those situations where the state had no existing authority.
Requiring the state to exhaust its existing mechanisms of
social control, both civil and criminal, would narrow the focus.
The model that I used was the sexual psychopath statute, not
as a substitute for criminal punishment, but to be applied
when dangerousness continued after deserved punishment
ended. The mechanism used was the requirement that the
authority to confine the person either had or was "about to
expire.""l 8
116. Id. at 17 n.14. Letter from John Monahan to Norval Morris (February 27,
1984).
117. Stuart Scheingold has, correctly in my view, characterized judgments of this
nature as "policy moderation at the local level." STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE
POLITICS OF STREET CRIME 185 (1991). He sees them as one of "a variety of coping
strategies that mitigate, but are unlikely to neutralize, the punitive redirection of the
justice model." Id. at 188. To the extent that the redirection results from changes in
the values of the culture he is, of course, correct.
118. The authorization to initiate the new commitment proceeding contains this
limitation:
When it appears that: (1) The sentence of a person who has been convicted of
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As far as I could tell, this notion was unique in sexual psy-
chopathy statutes 19 but had been used with general civil com-
mitment statutes.12 0 The use of civil commitment after
criminal jurisdiction ended has never presented constitutional
impediments. In Humphrey v. Cady, Justice Marshall did not
even comment on the fact that Wisconsin's indefinite series of
five year 12 civil commitments far exceeded the statutory maxi-
mum for the crime that triggered eligibility for civil commit-
ment. In Jones v. United States, all the justices assumed that
the power to civilly commit one who was "mentally ill and
dangerous" could extend beyond the end of criminal jurisdic-
tion.122 They disagreed with the inadequate procedural protec-
tions necessary in the transition from criminal to civil
jurisdiction. The provision in Washington's sexual psychopath
statute providing that acquittal of the underlying crime did not
abate the sexual psychopathy proceeding had withstood consti-
tutional attack.123  The court did not suggest any substantive
limitations under the due process clause.
1 24
a sexually violent offense is about to expire, or has expired on, before, or after
July 1, 1990; (2) the term of confinement of a person found to have committed
a sexually violent offense as a juvenile is about to expire, or has expired on,
before, or after July 1, 1990; (3) a person who has been charged with a
sexually violent offense and who has been determined to be incompetent to
stand trial is about to be released, or has been released on, before or after July
1, 1990, pursuant to RCW § 10.77.090(3); or (4) a person who has been found
not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent offense is about to be
released, or has been released on, before, or after July 1, 1990, pursuant to
RCW § 10.77.020(3); prosecuting attorney of the county where the person was
convicted or charged or the attorney general if requested by the prosecuting
atorney may file a petition alleging that the person is a "sexually violent
predator" and stating sufficient facts to support such allegation.
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (Supp. 1990-91).
119. In contrast, the District of Columbia has a sexual psychopath statute that
does not depend on a criminal prosecution. D.C. CODE § 22-3503 to 22-3511 (1989). It
authorizes indefinite commitment of those "not insane, who by a course of repeated
misconduct in sexual matters has evidenced such lack of power to control his sexual
impulses as to be dangerous to other persons because he is likely to attack or
otherwises inflict injury, loss, pain, or other evil on the objects of his desire." D.C.
CODE § 22-3503(1) (1989). The constitutionality of this statute has never been passed
upon by the United States Supreme Court, but it has been found constitutional by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415 (D.C.
Cir. 1953); Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
120. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
121. 405 U.S. 504 (1972). See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
122. 463 U.S. 354 (1983). See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
123. State v. Bunich, 28 Wash. App. 713, 626 P.2d 47 (1981).
124. My confidence in this prediction of constitutionality was not undermined by
the fact that the author of the opinion in State v. Bunich, the Honorable Keith Callow,
was, in 1989, Chief Justice of the Washington Supreme Court, nor was it undermined
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Restricting the use of civil commitment to those situations
where it was the only available protective means would signifi-
cantly limit its use but would not exhaust the methods of nar-
rowing its scope. Experts confirmed the common sense view
that past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior.
125
Therefore, limiting eligibility to those who previously commit-
ted acts of sexual violence would both narrow the focus and
improve the accuracy of the prediction. The proposal was thus
limited to those who had committed a "sexually violent
offense" 126 in the past.
The authorization's scope could also be narrowed by focus-
ing on the definition of the danger sought to be prevented
through civil commitment. All sex offenses involve violence,127
but not all sex offenses are the same. Most sex offenses, in
fact, occur between persons who know one another. These
by the fact that another member of the panel, the Honorable Barbara Durham, was
also now a Justice of the Washington Supreme Court.
125. Morris & Miller, supra note 99, at 13-16.
126. As defined under Washington law:
[s]exually violent offense" means an act committed on, before, or after July 1,
1990, that is: (a) An act defined in Title 9A RCW as rape in the first degree,
rape in the second degree by forcible compulsion, rape of a child in the first or
second degree, statutory rape in the first or second degree, indecent liberties
by forcible compulsion, indecent liberties against a child under age fourteen,
incest against a child under age fourteen, or child molestation in the first or
second degree; (b) a felony offense in effect at any time prior to July 1, 1990,
that is comparable to a sexually violent offense as defined in (a) of this
subsection, or any federal or out-of-state conviction for a felony offense that
under the laws of this state would be a sexually violent offense as defined in
this subsection; (c) an act of murder in the first or second degree, assault in
the first or second degree, kidnapping in the first or second degree, burglary
in the first degree, residential burglary, or unlawful imprisonment, which act,
either at the time of sentencing for the offense or subsequently during civil
commitment proceedings pursuant to chapter 71.09 RCW, has been
determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated, as
that term is defined in RCW 9.94A.030; or (d) an act as described in chapter
9A.28 RCW that is an attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy to
commit one of the felonies designated in (a), (b), or (c) of this subsection.
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(4) (Supp. 1990-91).
127. This was made clear to all of us when we presented our tentative
recommendations at the six public hearings that the Task Force held throughout the
state. In contrast to typical hearings on law reform proposals which attract only the
"usual suspects," these hearings attracted hundreds of citizens. Their comments were
only infrequently specifically directed to individual recommendations. Over and over,
citizens shared personal revelations of the injuries that they, their families, and their
communities had suffered because of sexual violence. The chair imposed no
requirements of relevance nor limits on time. The Task Force, he announced at the
beginning of each hearing, would stay as long as anyone wanted to speak to us.
Although not all members could attend each hearing, we all attended some, and we
were all moved by the anguish expressed.
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crimes, as serious and damaging as they surely are, were not
what produced the public outrage that led to the creation of
the Task Force. The very randomness of Earl Shriner's act
produced the sense of vulnerability that was at the core of the
public's fear. The Governor used the term "predatory" in his
Executive Order creating the Task Force,12' and I used that
term to further focus the proposed remedy. "Predatory" was
defined as "acts directed towards strangers or individuals with
whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the
primary purpose of victimization.' 29  Only those who were
"likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence'13 0 would
be eligible for civil commitment under the proposal.
The proposal defined the mental condition that produced
the danger justifying commitment in two alternative ways. It
included "personality disorder, '"131 a term with a generally
accepted definition in the medical community,132 and with
slight modification, the definition of mental abnormality from
Washington's sexual psychopath statute. 33  While the later
definition is legal, not medical, it would include those persons
suffering from "paraphilias,"' the medical diagnosis most
likely to apply to those who engage in predatory acts of sexual
violence. I included this definition because it focused on dan-
gerousness, which was the purpose of commitment, and
because it had previously survived constitutional attack.
3 5
I was confident that this proposal answered the central
question we faced; had it been in effect in 1987 it would have
provided the authority to protect the public against Earl
Shriner. Although I could not precisely predict how many
individuals would be eligible for commitment under this propo-
128. "The safety of people in our communities is being jeopardized by a number of
individuals who engage in predatory, violent behavior, often accompanied by sexual
assault." Exec. Order No. 89-13-055, WASH. ST. REG. (1989).
129. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(3) (Supp. 1990-91).
130. Id. § 71.09.020(1).
131. Id. § 71.09.020(1).
132. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS DSM-III-R (3d ed. rev. 1987).
133. The Washington Statute defines "mental abnormality" as "a congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the
person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such person a
menace to the health and safety of others." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(2) (Supp.
1990-91).
134. For a definition accessable to laypersons, see 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE, Sex Offenses, 1485, 1489 (1983).
135. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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sal, I was also confident that its limitations would result in far
fewer commitments than any of the proposed alternatives.
With the scope of the proposal fixed, I turned to the proce-
dures to be employed. The premise was that the full panoply
of procedural protections should be provided. Providing the
defendant with full access to counsel and expert witnesses 3 '
would ensure that the vagaries of prediction were fully
explored. It would also provide the balance to check, if not
eliminate, the prejudice that can result when the state is pro-
viding the only expert testimony. I was confident that attor-
neys for those subject to commitment would have no difficulty
finding qualified experts to present the vagaries of predicting
future violence to the jury. Although this would not prevent
inaccurate predictions, it would insure that juries were aware
of the difficulty of their determination.
Requiring that a jury"s7 find the requisite future danger-
ousness beyond a reasonable doubt'-8 would introduce "into
the process a lay judgment, reflecting values generally held in
the community, concerning the kinds of potential harm that
justify the State in confining a person for compulsory treat-
ment.' 1 39 The use of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
rather than its civil analogue of "clear, cogent and convincing"
emphasized the importance of the determination. I believe
that "beyond a reasonable doubt" better conveys that message
to lay persons.
136. The statute provides for counsel and expert witnesses as follows:
At all stages of the proceedings under this chapter, any person subject to this
chapter shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, and if the person is
indigent, the court shall appoint counsel to assist him or her. Whenever any
person is subjected to an examination under this chapter, he or she may
retain experts or professional persons to perform an examination on their
behalf. When the person wishes to be examined by a qualified expert or
professional person of his or her own choice, such examiner shall be
permitted to have reasonable access to the person for the purpose of such
examination, as well as to all relevant medical and psychological records and
reports. In the case of a person who is indigent, the court shall, upon the
person's request, assist the person in obtaining an expert or professional
person to perform an examination or participate in the trial on the person's
behalf.
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.050 (Supp. 1990-91).
137. "The person, the prosecuting attorney or attorney general, or the judge shall
have the right to demand that the trial be before a jury. If no demand is made, the
trial shall be before the court." Id. § 71.09.050.
138. "The court or jury shall determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
person is a sexually violent predator." Id. § 71.09.060(1).




Treatment of the mental condition that produces preda-
tory acts of sexual violence is problematic at best. Existing
treatment in the United States is behaviorally based, and
Washington's program at the Twin Rivers Correctional Center
appeared to be state-of-the-art. The programs are long term,
particularly for the exceptionally violent, and rely on the con-
sent of participants. We anticipated that for some, if not most,
of those committed, consent would not be forthcoming. Phar-
macological treatment remains in its infancy and raises imme-
diate constitutional issues. We did not want to freeze
treatment at our present level of knowledge; yet, we sought
some limits to what could be done in the name of treatment.
Our solution was to rely on the Constitution and the court's
ability to apply constitutional principles to any future treat-
ment practices that might develop.
140
With regard to release from commitment, we sought pro-
cedures that would both protect the public from dangerous
persons and protect those committed from the long-term ware-
housing characteristic of Washington's civil commitment sys-
tem prior to the 1973 reforms. Our proposal required annual
reexaminations after commitment; in addition, the person com-
mitted has the right to retain an independent qualified expert
or professional person who is given access to "all records con-
cerning the person.' 1 4 ' Reports of the examination "shall be
provided to the court that committed the person.'
1 42
If the state's experts determine that "the person's mental
abnormality or personality has so changed that the person is
not likely to commit predatory acts of sexual violence if
released," the person is returned to the committing court for a
release hearing.143 The state has the right to demand a jury
trial on the issue of whether the person "is not safe to be at
large and that if discharged is likely to commit predatory acts
of sexual violence."' 4 The burden of proof is on the state,
140. RCW 71.09.080 requires conformity to "constitutional requirements for care
and treatment." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.080 (Supp. 1990-91).
141. "Each person committed under this chapter shall have a current examination
of his or her mental condition made at least once every year. The person may retain,
or if he or she is indigent and so requests, the court may appoint a qualified expert or a
professional person to examine him or her, and such expert or professional person




144. Id. § 71.09.090(1).
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beyond a reasonable doubt.145
The committed person also has the right to petition the
court directly for release. 46 In the absence of an affirmative
waiver of this right, the court must conduct a "show cause
hearing to determine whether facts exist that warrant a hear-
ing on whether the person's condition has so changed that he
or she is safe to be at large. ' 147 If the court finds that probable
cause exists, then a trial, with the same procedural protections
as at the original trial, is held on the issue of whether "the
committed person's mental abnormality or personality disorder
remains such that the person is not safe to be at large and if
released will engage in acts of sexual violence."' 48 The trial is
conducted with the same procedural protections as the original
trial, and the burden of proof is on the state, beyond a reason-
able doubt.
These procedural requirements are not without cost, but I
saw that as desirable. The cost of the procedural requirements
would encourage those with the authority to institute the com-
mitment process to weigh their decisions even more carefully.
This is particularly important where that decision will be made
by thirty-nine independently elected county prosecuting attor-
neys who are not responsible to any central authority. The
proposed statute was drafted as narrowly as possible while still
retaining its ability to provide an affirmative answer to our
central question. If such a statute had been in effect in 1987, it
would have provided the legal authority to confine Earl
Shriner.
The Task Force accepted this conclusion and as we worked
to refine the proposal, we shifted our attention from amend-
ments to the general civil commitment statute and from revi-
talization of the former sexual psychopath statute. The
proposed statute also provided a basis upon which to reject pro-
posals advocating a return to long indeterminate sentences for
sex offenders. It also provided the necessary assurance that
the legal power to act in compelling circumstances would exist
in the future; as a result, there was no need to depart from the





149. We did recommend a series of changes in the presumptive sentences provided
for sex offenses. Many Task Force members felt strongly that existing levels of
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The proposal had served its purpose. It filled the gap in
punishment were lower than were deserved by offenders who caused such harm to
their victims. To put a finer edge upon it, some believed that those who established
the existing levels of punishment had not seen sex crimes as being as serious as they,
in fact, were and consequently had not sufficiently valued the enduring pain and
anguish of the victims. For example, the presumptive sentence range for rape in the
second degree (forcible rape without a weapon or physical injury) was initially set in
1984 at 21 to 27 months. From the first days after the boy was attacked, advocates for
the victims of sex crimes had argued that society's response to sexual violence was
inadequate in all cases, not just those that became notorious. The September 1989
public hearings, in which person after person gave witness to the pain and anguish that
sexual violence had caused them and their families, led us all to concur in this view.
Judgment as to the quantum of punishment deserved is always reached in context.
No neutral principles exist from which to establish starting points. The consciousness
of those of us who had been involved in the initial establishment of those presumptive
sentences had changed. We concurred in recommending a series of increases in the
presumptive sentence ranges for these crimes that we believed provided deserved
sentences and retained proportionality between the relative seriousness of those
crimes. This was accomplished by increasing the offense seriousness levels of the
crimes. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.320 (Supp. 1990-91). The new seriousness levels
result in higher presumptive ranges for both first time and multiple offenders. The
following chart shows the increases for first time offenders:
Current Proposed
Ranking & Ranking &
Crime Midpoint Midpoint
First Degree Rape X 5 years XI 7.5 years
First Degree Rape of a Child X 5 years XI 7.5 years
Second Degree Rape VIII 2 years X 5 years
Second Degree Rape of a Child VIII 2 years X 5 years
First Degree Child Molestation VIII 2 years X 5 years
Indecent Liberties with Forcible Compulsion VII 18 months IX 3 years
Second Degree Child Molestation VI 13 months VII 18 months
Indecent Liberties w/o Forcible Compulsion VI 13 months VII 18 months
Third Degree Rape of a Child IV 6 months VI 12 + months
Third Degree Child Molestation III 2 months V 9 months
First Degree Sexual Misconduct with a Minor II 2 months V 9 months
Although some challenged the effectiveness of longer sentences as general or specific
deterrents or as providing the opportunity for rehabilitation, we based our recommen-
dation on the concensus that persons who committed these crimes deserved the
sentences we recommended.
We also focused on the presumptive sentence range for repeat sex offenders and
concluded for the same reasons that longer sentences were deserved. Once again, the
structure of the Sentencing Reform Act permitted us to focus on specific situations in
which we believed additional punishment was deserved. We recommended that prior
sex offense convictions be scored at three rather than the previous two points, which
has the effect of increasing presumptive sentence lengths for subsequent sex offense
convictions. We recommended that all juvenile convictions for sex offenses be
included in an adult's criminal history, not just those which occurred when the
offender was fifteen or older at the time of the juvenile's conviction. We also recom-
mended that convictions of "serious violence," WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(27)(a)
(Supp. 1990-91), begin to run consecutively, rather than concurrently, commencing at
the second conviction rather than the third as previously required.
We also addressed the issue of how to accurately identify as sex crimes those
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the state's legal authority and, to borrow from equal protection
terminology, it did so using the least restrictive alternative.
The Task Force accepted the proposal, by consensus, 150 as it
made all its decisions. Much discussion ensued, but no votes
and no dissents. We delivered our report to the Governor on
November 28, 1989. He recommended our proposals to the leg-
islature, which adopted the proposals with only minor modifi-
crimes that had sexual components. Prosecutors have made substantial progress in
recent years in accurately labeling sex crimes, yet situations still existed in which
crimes of a sexual nature resulted in convictions for assault or burglary. These convic-
tions did not disclose the sexual nature of the crime, resulting in less serious punish-
ment than we believed they should receive. To the extent this treatment was caused
by the discretion of prosecutors, little can be done through legislation. But to the
extent that motive is rarely an element of a crime and thus sexually motivated crimes
without sexual results are accurately charged as nonsexual crimes, legislation could
provide a remedy. We recommended the addition of a special allegation of "sexual
motivation" in RCW § 9.04A.030(30) that, if proved as any other element, would accu-
rately label the crime with its true nature. Such a finding would authorize an excep-
tional sentence under RCW § 9.94A.390(2)(e) and would result in the crime being
classified as a "sex offense" in the future. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(29) (Supp.
1990-91).
Recognizing that almost all sex offenders would return to the community and that
recidivism was at its highest in the period shortly following release, the Task Force
recommended that the mandatory period of community supervision following release
be extended from one to at least two years. Id. § 9.94A.120(8)(b).
This series of recommendations did not mean that we rejected treatment for sex
offenders. We recognized the difficulty of successfully treating sex offenders, particu-
larly those whose behavior has become deeply ingrained. Yet we also recognized that
almost all sex offenders would be released and that future public safety required us to
continue in our efforts to treat sex offenders. As a result, we recommended continua-
tion of the sentencing option permitting treatment of first-time sex offenders in the
community, although we recommended a series of changes to increase the accountabil-
ity. Id. § 9.94A.120(8). Additionally, we advised that statutory limits on eligibility for
sex offender treatment programs in prison be removed and that the treatment pro-
gram be expanded by 200 beds. Id. § 9.94A.120(8)(b). We recommended that a commu-
nity treatment option be available for juvenile sex offenders, modeled on that for
adults, and that funds for the treatment of juvenile sex offenders be increased. Id.
§ 13.40.160(5).
We also proposed that the state create a system to register convicted sex offenders
and authorize law enforcement to notify the community of their release. Id. § 4.24.550,
9A.44.130.
We recommended the creation of a grant program to fund enhanced victim serv-
ices and the creation of a crime victim advocate position in state government. Finally,
we recommended funding for research to evaluate the effectiveness of sex offender
treatment programs and of treatment services for victims.
All our recommendations were adopted simultaneously with our proposal for civil
commitment of sexually violent predators.
150. By consensus, I do not mean to imply that we all agreed with every detail of
our civil commitment proposal or of our other proposals, and certainly not that we all
shared the same degree of enthusiasm for each specific recommendation. Each of us,
however, recognized that other members strongly supported certain recommendations,
and we all sought a set of recommendations that all could support.
Confronting Violence
cations by a unanimous vote.1 5 '
To a point, the plot of this story is not new. Forty years
ago, the eminent criminologist Edwin Sutherland described the
events leading to the diffusion of sexual psychopath laws
through the United States in a similar story. 5 2 As he summa-
rized it, "a community is thrown into panic by a few serious
sex crimes, which are given nation-wide publicity; the commu-
nity acts in an agitated manner, and all sorts of proposals are
made; a committee is then appointed to study the facts and to
make recommendations."' 3 The committees, on which psychi-
atrists were heavily represented, would then recommend the
adoption of sexual psychopath laws as "the most scientific and
enlightened method of protecting society against sex
criminals."'" Sutherland, who believed such laws were "dan-
gerous and futile,"' 5 located the cause of this result in "a gen-
eral social movement,"'" the triumph of "treatment policy"
over "punitive policy.'
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Prior to the formation of the Task Force, the story Suther-
land told and the story I have told are the same. But our Task
Force had a different composition and our recommendations
were significantly different. Those two differences were not
unrelated. Psychiatrists and psychologists were not heavily
represented on the Task Force,' and they did not recommend
sexual psychopath laws as "the most scientific and enlightened
method of protecting society against sex criminals."'5 s They
shared our belief in the difficulty of accurately predicting
future violence and they promised no cure for predatory sex-
ual violence.
Another group was also represented on the Task Force.
The pain that sexual violence produces was the reason that the
Task Force was created; it was also present on the Task Force.
151. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001-1013.
152. Edwin H. Sutherland, The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws, 56 AM. J. OF
Soc. 142 (1950).
153. Id. at 142.
154. Id. at 147.
155. Id. at 142.
156. Id. at 147.
157. Id.
158. The 24 members of the Task Force included two psychiatrists and a
psychologist. Dr. Roland Maiuro of the University of Washington School of Medicine
and Dr. Robert Scherz of Mary Bridge Children's Hospital are psychiatrists. Dr. Paul
West is a clinical psychologist.
159. See Sutherland, supra note 152, at 142.
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The presence of Helen Harlow, Ida Ballasiotes, and Trish
Tobias as Task Force members made it impossible to view
these issues as abstract legal issues. Our work was "in the field
of pain and death,""16 and their presence made us constantly
aware that whatever we did, or chose not to do, would have a
direct, tangible impact on individuals. I do not believe that this
influence blinded us to the presence of the other potential vic-
tims, the false positives, those who would lose their freedom
when inaccurately labeled as likely to engage in predatory acts
of sexual violence. For me, this focus heightened my sensitiv-
ity to the balancing that would inevitably occur.1 61 I was con-
stantly aware that I was not engaged in an abstract intellectual
enterprise, but rather the "organized practice of social vio-
lence. 1 162 This awareness both produced our proposal and was
responsible for its narrow focus.
As I reflect on the recommendations we made, I see no
"general social movement,"' 63 only a pragmatic'" response to a
problem, a response which, in its context, seemed the best of
the available alternatives, nothing more grand than that.
This justification is akin to triage,165 rooted in necessity.
One facing a situation where harm is inevitable is justified in
160. Cover, supra note 8.
161. As Zimring and Hawkins counsel "[w]hat is required precisely in using
predictions of dangerousness is an active and troubled conscience." Franklin E.
Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Dangerousness and Criminal Justice, 85 MICH. L. REV.
481, 508 (1986).
162. Cover, supra note 8.
163. See Sutherland, supra note 152.
164. I use the term "pragmatic" in both senses Thomas Gray identifies:
[F]irst . . . it came always embodied in practices-habits and patterns of
perceiving and conceiving that had developed out of and served to guide
activity . . . [and] [slecond ... as an adaptive function . . . to help resolve, by
means of conscious reflection and experimental revision, the real problems
and live doubts that arose in the course of acting on unreflective and habitual
practices.
Thomas C. Gray, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 798 (1989). I
also understand, as my friend and former colleague Pierre Schlag points out: "Prag-
matism provides an intellectually respectable justification for one's inability or refusal
to provide a theoretically cogent account of what one is doing." Pierre Schlag, The
Problem of the Subject, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1627, 1706 (1991). But what determines the
cogency of a proposal? I believe the answer lies in what kind of prophet one aspires to
be. Compare Lynn A. Baker, "Just Do It" Pragmatism and Progressive Social
Change, 78 VA. L. REV. 697 (1992) with Richard Rorty, What Can You Expect From
Anti-Foundationalist Philosophers?, 78 VA. L. REV. 719 (1992).
165. See GERALD R. WINSLOW, TRIAGE AND JUSTICE (1982). As Floud and Young
put it, "[t]he problem is to make a just redistribution of risk in circumstances that do




using his abilities to minimize inevitable harm. My justifica-
tion was, and is, that the pain that women and children will
suffer from sexual violence and the pain that those errone-
ously committed will also suffer will be, in the aggregate, sig-
nificantly less than would have been the case had any of the
other alternatives been adopted. Law reform is politics, and
politics is the art of the possible. This was, in my judgment,
the best possible balance that could be achieved. I believed in
1989, and on reflection I still believe, that the course I took did
less harm in the pursuit of good than would otherwise have
been the case.'66 I will stand on that.
166. As I reread this piece, I have the strong sense that it is far too "I" centered.
My justification is that I was there. I used such power as I had to bring about the
result I favored. I did not act alone but I was at least an accomplice. My field is
criminal law, and the criminal law holds accomplices responsible to the same extent as
principals. Thus, the need for justification.
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